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I. INTRODUCTION

On June 29, 2001, just outside Klamath Falls, Oregon, an angry mob of
farmers took actions into their own hands. Massing around the closed
headgates of a federally operated irrigation ditch, the crowd defied federal
government orders, burst open the headgate locks, and returned the flow of
water to the thirsty soils of their croplands. ' The mob stayed put and made
camp for the next few days, challenging federal officials time after time by
unlocking the gates as soon as they had been closed. The crowd finally
was dispersed under the stern direction of United States Marshals. The
battle lines could not have been more clearly drawn. The farmers cried for
relief from dry irrigation ditches and the specter of failed crops. The
federal government stood firm: the gates had to stay shut and farmlands go
dry in order to save endangered fish dependent on the water stored in
Upper Klamath Lake and flowing in the Klamath River. The following
March, however, amidst the flash of news cameras, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Secretary of the Interior quite publicly opened the very
same headgates.2 What made the first liberation of water an act of civil
disobedience and the latter a high-profile case of wise federal governance?
Improbably, the answer came from a room full of scientists and a practice
called peer review.
This saga, popularly known as "the Klamath," made headlines around
the nation and served as a rallying call for many communities in the
Western United States concerned about the future in the face of "their
water" being dedicated to endangered species protection. 3 The standoff
had been building ever since two local species of sucker fish found in the
lake and a population of coho salmon found in the river below the dam
had been listed for protection under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) .
This placed the fish under the watchful protection of the federal
government. 5 When the government declared that the fish could no longer

1. For an account of the events described in this paragraph, see Ted Williams, Salmon Stakes,
105 AUDUBON 42 (2003), available at http://magazine.audubon.org/incite/incite0303.html. For a
comprehensive history of the Klamath River Basin and the events involving the "crisis of 2001," see
Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath Basin, 30
ECOLOGY L.Q. 279 (2003).

2. See Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 11, at 334-35.
3.

See id. at 321-24.

4. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. § 136, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44, and in other scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
5. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) is responsible for the suckers, and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) for the salmon. For a description of the
regulatory and other authorities FWS and NOAA administer under the ESA, see infra notes 48-65 and

20061

IN DEFENSE OF REGULATORY PEER REVIEW

tolerate the release of water from the lake for irrigation, 6 angry farmers
around the Klamath took charge, transforming the conflict into "Exhibit
Number One" for critics of the ESA and their charge that agencies work
on the basis of so-called "junk science." 7 As closely as the popular press
followed both these developments, however, it completely missed the
other consequence of the Klamath story, one that we believe has proven
far more significant-the rise of regulatory peer review.
The collision of two important but conflicting federal regulatory
policies-providing a secure supply of irrigation water to Western farmers
versus providing the same water to endangered fish in Western lakes and
rivers-led to stalemate, and the federal government turned to peer review
to break the tie. Following the public outcry over the "fish-versushumans" decision and the standoff between farmers and federal officials at
the floodgates, the National Research Council (NRC), an arm of the
National Academy of Science, was requested to convene a committee of
experts, known as the Klamath Committee, to conduct a peer review of the
agencies' decisions-the first ever conducted of an agency decision of this
magnitude under the ESA. 8

accompanying text.
6. Specifically, according to FWS and NOAA, further releases would have violated the ESA's
provision that each federal agency "insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such
agency ... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
species." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). See Doremus & Tarlock, supranote 1,at 316-20.
7. See Daniel J. McGarvey & Brett Marshall, Making Sense of Scientists and "Sound Science".Truth and Consequencesfor EndangeredSpecies in the Klamath Basin and Beyond, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q.
73, 79-80 (2005). The National Research Council's Committee on Endangered and Threatened Fishes
in the Klamath River Basin (Klamath Committee) also was the target of much criticism, including
from scientists hired by different interest groups involved in the battle for water, and the situation soon
deteriorated into what some observers referred to as "combat biology." Robert F. Service, "Combat
Biology" on the Klamath, SCIENCE, Apr. 2003, at 36, 36. The lack of established structure for carrying
out the peer review probably contributed to the ways in which the findings were used and abused--one
reason for our proposal, infra Part VI.
8. J.B. Ruhl was a member of the Klamath Committee. The Klamath Committee provided a
report thoroughly studying the area's land use and water management history. See COMM. ON
ENDANGERED & THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN: CAUSES OF DECLINE AND

STRATEGIES FOR RECOVERY 46-94 (2004) [hereinafter KLAMATH COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT]. The

Klamath Committee also provided detail in an interim report. See COMM. ON ENDANGERED &
THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENTIFIC
EVALUATION OF BIOLOGICAL OPINIONS ON ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH
RIVER BASIN: INTERIM REPORT (2002) [hereinafter KLAMATH COMMITTEE INTERIM REPORT].

Additional background and analysis of the events surrounding the Klamath can be found in Reed D.
Benson, Giving Suckers (and Salmon) an Even Break: Klamath Basin Water and the Endangered
Species Act, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 197 (2002); Marcilynn A. Burke, Klamath Farmersand Cappuccino
Cowboys: The Rhetoric of the Endangered Species Act and Why It (Still) Matters, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y F. 441 (2004); Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 1;McGarvey & Marshall, supra note 7; Julia
Muedeking, Note, Taking the Heart of the Klamath Basin: Is It Free?, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 217
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The initial results of the Klamath Committee's peer review sparked a
firestorm of controversy. 9 Reviewing the information available to the
federal agencies responsible for managing the fish at the time of their
respective decisions, the experts found that "no substantial scientific
foundation" existed for the agencies' conclusions.' 0 In other words, the
conclusions that further reducing lake levels would jeopardize the suckers
and that reducing river flows would harm the salmon could not be justified
based on the available data. Releasing irrigation waters might harm the
endangered fish, or it might not-the science was too uncertain to say.
Simply put, the agencies said that the science got them from point A to
point B, but the Klamath Committee concluded it did not. Soon after, the
floodgates were dramatically re-opened.
After the Klamath Committee issued its opinion, many observers began
to ask whether peer review should guide decisions in other regulatory
settings. Indeed, since the Klamath controversy, strong, insistent calls for
improving agency decisions based on science have been heard from the
White House" and from Congress.' 2 This self-proclaimed "sound
science" movement argues that procedural safeguards to ensure better use
of scientific data will improve agency decisions.' 3 Ensuring the proper

(2003); Coi S. Parobek, Note, Of Farmers' Takes and Fishes' Takings: Fifth Amendment
Compensation Claims When the Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights Collide, 27 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 177 (2003).
9. See Doremus and Tarlock, supra note 1, at 326.
10. Id. at 4 (finding no scientific evidence supporting requirement of increased lake levels or
increased stream flow).
11. The Bush Administration has aggressively advanced this agenda through means such as
prescribing standards for agency data quality control. See, e.g., Guidelines for Ensuring and
Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal
Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452 (Feb. 22, 2002); see generally ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
SUMMARY OF FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET REQUEST, 34 Env't Rep. (BNA) S-17, S-112 to S-121 (Feb.
3, 2003) (including "Goal 8," which the agency described as "Sound Science, Improved
Understanding of Environmental Risk, and Greater Innovation to Address Environmental Problems").
12. Legislative proposals routinely use the "sound science" label to gain support. See, e.g., Sound
Science for Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2003, H.R. 1662, 108th Cong. (2003); Sound
Science for Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2002, H.R. 4840, 107th Cong. (2002).
13. See David E. Adelman, Scientific Activism and Restraint: The Interplay of Statistics,
Judgment, and Procedure in Environmental Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 497, 498 (2004)
("[S]chisms exist over how science is used in setting environmental policy. For most critics of
environmental regulation, broad reliance on science is viewed as progress towards increased rationality
and objectivity."). A comprehensive overview of the sound science debate is found in Thomas 0.
McGarity, Our Science Is Sound Science and Their Science Is Junk Science: Science-Based Strategies
for Avoiding Accountability and Responsibilityfor Risk-Producing Products and Activities, 52 U.
KAN. L. REv. 897 (2004). A more entertaining, though studiously documented account is available in
CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE (2005). The discussion and debate regarding the

use of "sound science" in environmental law is pervasive-we found over 39,000 web sites through a
Google search of"'sound science' AND 'environmental law."' For a historical perspective on the use
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basis for agency decisions has, of course, been a concern of administrative
procedures since the New Deal. 14 But the focus of administrative law for
agencies' use of science has been the prevention of abusive practices, such
as suppression or manipulation of data, not the quality of the data
themselves. The focus of interested parties has been to expose these
practices, and that of judges has been to halt them when they amount to
arbitrary and capricious actions or an abuse of discretion. 15 Yet the sound
science movement seeks more than the traditional protections afforded by
these conventions of administrative law. Its claim is that agencies will use
better science when they are required to employ the scientific method as
their decision making protocol. 16 More specifically, just as peer review is
one of the principal components of the scientific method, it7 has become
one of the principal demands of the "sound science" agenda. 1
Scientific peer review is generally described as a rigorous review and
critique of a study's methods, results, and findings that is conducted by
others in the relevant field who have the requisite training and expertise,
who have no pecuniary or other disqualifying bias with respect to the
topic, and who are independent of the persons who performed the study. 18

of science in environmental law, referencing a wealth of literature on the topic and suggesting several
"cautionary tales" about the promotion of using more "good science," see Oliver Houck, Talesfrom a
Troubled Marriage:Science and Law in Environmental Policy, 302 SCI. 1926, 1926 (2003). Professor
Wendy Wagner has produced the most extensive body of work examining the claim for using more
and better science in environmental law. See Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and
Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181 (1999); Wendy E. Wagner, The 'Bad Science'
Fiction.: Reclaiming the Debate Over the Role of Science in Public Health and Environmental

Regulation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2003, at 63 [hereinafter Wagner, Bad Science];
Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995)
[hereinafter Wagner, Science Charade].
14. See JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1978); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975). For a more recent discussion, see David Markell, "Slack" in the
Administrative State and Its Implicationsfor Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV.

1 (2005).
15. For a more complete description of administrative law protections against agency misuse of
science, see infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
16. For discussions of how demanding that agencies employ the scientific method would affect
agency decisions, see Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in
Natural Resources Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1, 17-20 (2005); J.B. Ruhl, The
Battle over EndangeredSpecies Act Methodology, 34 ENVTL. L. 555, 584-91 (2004).
17. See MOONEY, supra note 13, at 116-19. A counter-movement also has emerged. For
example, a group of legal scholars openly skeptical of the movement's motives has formed to, among

other things, monitor and challenge initiatives of the "sound science" movement such as proposals for
requiring agencies to subject their proposed decisions to regulatory peer review. See Center for

Progressive Reform Issues; Clean Science, http://www.progressiveregulation.org/issue_science.cfm
(last visited Mar. 29, 2006).
18. THE DEP'T OF ENERGY'S OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. ET AL., PEER REVIEW IN ENVIRONMENTAL
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 2 (1998). A peer is "a person having technical expertise in
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Peer review is commonplace, indeed, fundamental, to the practice of
science. It is the gold standard for determining publication and general
acceptance of scientific research.
Just as scientific peer review involves independent evaluation of
scientific research, regulatory peer review refers to the outside evaluation
of an administrative agency's compilation, selection, or use of scientific
data to support a proposed regulatory decision such as a rule, standard,
permit, or other policy. Like scientific peer review, the review and critique
would be conducted prior to the agency's final decision by qualified,
independent experts who have no pecuniary or other conflict of interest in
the outcome of the agency's decision. If peer review works for science,
goes the argument, it should work for agency decisions that purport to rely
on science as well.
This seemingly straightforward logic has not, however, met with easy
acceptance. The growing debate over agency use of sound science, and of
regulatory peer review in particular, has become increasingly polarized,
with strong claims made on both sides. To Congressman Greg Walden (ROr.), for example, the case for peer review is obvious.
If you went to a doctor and he said to you, "we are going to have to
take off your right leg," you'd probably want a second opinion.
Right now under the Endangered Species Act plants, animals, and
people don't have the chance to seek a second opinion; you just get
cut off at the knees. 19
By contrast, the nongovernmental organization Public Citizen contends
that mandating the uniform use of peer review by federal agencies would:
favor regulated industry and introduce potentially massive costs and
delay, thus injecting paralysis by analysis into the regulatory
process. . . . It is no overstatement that strict application of
[regulatory peer review] would bring many ordinary functions to a
grinding halt, including the government's obligation to present
the subject matter to be reviewed (or a subset of the subject matter to be reviewed) to a degree at least
equivalent to that needed for the original work." Id. at 28. "The peer's independence from the work
being reviewed means that the peer, a) was not involved as a participant, supervisor, technical
reviewer, or advisor in the work being reviewed, and b) to the extent practical, has sufficient freedom
from funding considerations to assure the work is impartially reviewed." Id.
19. Greg Walden, Statement Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Minerals of the H. Comm. on
Resources on H.R. 1662, 3 (Feb. 4, 2004), http://walden.house.gov/issues/esa/108thcongress/ESA
statement.pdf (Rep. Walden (R-OR) was the Sponsor of H.R. 1662).
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public health, environmental and other information on a timely
basis.20
The increasing temperature of this debate reflects action heating up in
Washington as well. A series of bills requiring regulatory peer review has
been proposed in Congress, 2 1 and the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) has finalized peer review requirements for the "information
products" regulatory agencies use in classes of regulatory decisions likely
to have significant economic or other impacts.2 2 That regulatory peer
review has moved so quickly from the newspapers to the Federal Register
signals the potentially significant ramifications it could have. Regulatory
peer review is being added to the administrative law toolbox, and it is
important to understand what this means for agency practice in the future.
To make sense of the competing claims over regulatory peer review,
three fundamental questions need to be answered: The first is how many
Klamaths are there? Regulatory peer review can be justified only if many
agency policy decisions that should be based at least in part on science
actually have no or insufficient scientific basis. Increased use of peer
review will undeniably impose costs on agencies, and unless there is first a
firm sense of how often agencies reach decisions without sufficient
scientific support, we may end up overreacting-using a sledgehammer to
crack an acorn. Second, even if the Klamath experience is widespreadeven if agencies frequently fail to adequately justify policy decisions on
scientific grounds--are these actually poorpolicy decisions? The Klamath
Committee, it is worth noting, never condemned the federal government's
decision to close the floodgates, acknowledging that the decision may or
may not have been justified on policy grounds.23 It just was not justified
on scientific grounds alone.24 If the policy decision is on target, does it
really matter that it was not justified by the available data, or does the lack
of a finn scientific basis inherently call into question the risk of policy

20.

Letter from Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizen to D. Margo Schwab, Office of Info. &

Regulatory Affairs, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 1-2 (Dec. 15, 2003), http://www.progressive
regulation.org/articles/peer/PublicCitizenPRComments.pdf.

21.

See, e.g., Sound Science for Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2003, H.R. 1662, 108th

Cong. (2003). The ESA bills are discussed in more detail infra at notes 120-31 and accompanying
text.
22. See Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664 (Jan. 14, 2005).
OMB's policy unfolded through several iterations. See Revised Information Quality Bulletin on Peer

Review, 69 Fed. Reg. 23,230 (Apr. 28, 2004); Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information
Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023 (Sept. 15, 2003). The history and details of OMB's policy are discussed
infra at notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
24. See KLAMATH COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 34-35.
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failure? Finally, even if there necessarily is cause for concern when

agencies explicitly base their policy decisions on inadequate scientific
foundations, does regulatorypeer review provide an effective safeguard?
Put differently, if instances such as the Klamath do pose a significant risk
of policy failure, is regulatory peer review the answer? Will it avoid more

Klamaths in the future?
Despite the raucous public debate over regulatory peer review, none of
these questions has been adequately addressed in scholarly literature,
much less by the folksy wisdom and Chicken Little cries of the various
interest group combatants. Most legal scholarship on the issue has opposed
the use of regulatory peer review, but, as useful and insightful as some of
25

this work has proven to be, we believe the issue is far from put to rest.

Indeed, most of the academic commentary has focused on whether

agencies produce or rely on flawed scientific evidence or so-called "bad
science." Largely overlooked, but pertinent to the question of what role
peer review could play, is the potential that agencies might misuse
perfectly credible science, or so-called "good science," by overstating the
extent to which it supports their policy and regulatory decisions. No study
has ever demonstrated whether use of regulatory peer review would have
detected other instances, like the Klamath, in which the concern is that the

agency has stretched credible science too far in an effort to justify its
policy decision, or whether the benefits of detecting those instances would
have justified the costs of the peer review programs, or whether it would
have even mattered from the standpoint of reaching sound policy
decisions.2 6 This Article addresses these questions directly, grounding the

25. For a general discussion of the role of peer review in regulatory law, see Lars Noah,
Scientific "Republicanism ": Expert Peer Review and the Quest for Regulatory Deliberation, 49
EMORY L.J. 1033 (2000). The Klamath saga prompted several scholars to examine the use of peer
review in the context of endangered species protection. See Burke, supra note 8, at 506-14; Doremus
& Tarlock, supra note 1, at 324-31; McGarvey & Marshall, supra note 7, at 107-11. Holly Doremus
and J.B. Ruhl have each more broadly discussed the merits of using peer review in connection with
administration of the Endangered Species Act. See Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future
of the Endangered Species Act's Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397 (2004); J.B. Ruhl,
Prescribingthe Right Dose of Peer Review for the Endangered Species Act, 83 NEB. L. REV. 398
(2004). Wendy Wagner has critiqued proposals for regulatory peer review in the broader context of
environmental law in general. Wagner, Bad Science, supra note 13, at 67-84; Wagner, Science
Charade,supra note 13, at 1699-1701. OMB's peer review policy, which extends to a wide range of
regulatory agencies, has also been the subject of scholarly analysis. See Sarah Grimmer, Recent
Development, Public Controversy over Peer Review, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 275 (2005); Sidney A.
Shapiro, OMB's DubiousPeer Review Procedures,34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,064 (2004).
26. Wendy Wagner has pointed out that the debate over regulatory peer review has focused
primarily on agencies that establish science-based standards and perform scientific functions directly,
such as the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) setting of toxicity levels or the Food and Drug
Administration's review of drug health effects, and thus has largely ignored "the larger universe of
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debate over the use of regulatory peer review in agency decision making
and charting a productive route forward.
Part II of the Article describes scientific peer review and its practical
application in journal publication, grant-award, and agency settings,
illustrating the distinction between those applications and regulatory peer
review. The obvious difference between the use of peer review in
scientific research settings and in agency regulatory settings is that science
does not purport to involve normative policy decisions, whereas regulation
explicitly does. This section thus explores how peer review would operate
in that different context.
The next two sections of the Article address the current debate over
regulatory peer review, setting out the arguments in favor of its use in Part
III and their critiques in Part IV. Ironically, claims pro and con about
regulatory peer review rely on very few data points-any rigorous peer
review of their merits would fault them for this. In order to provide an
empirical basis for our evaluation, therefore, we conducted a nationwide
survey of environmental lawyers to reveal the perceptions of practitioners
whose clients are or would be affected by regulatory peer review. As
reported infra, we found a remarkably intense divergence of opinion
between private and public sector attorneys over the prevalence of poor
use of science by regulatory agencies, the need for regulatory peer review
in response, and its likely effectiveness. Generally, representatives of
industry, and also, increasingly, of environmental groups, believe agencies
frequently base policy decisions on inadequate scientific foundations,
whereas agency representatives defend their performance. The debate
raging in the White House and Congress, in other words, is not merely
political rhetoric. It reflects a sharp, deep division of opinion among the
front line practitioners of administrative law who have the experience to
evaluate the prospects of regulatory peer review. Put simply, regulatory
peer review has become a polarizing and deeply felt issue.
In Part V of the Article we step back from the intensity of the debate to
reassess the role of peer review in the regulatory process, suggesting a
different way to think about its potential costs, benefits, and appropriate
regulatory decisions involving the grant of permits and licenses." See Wagner, Bad Science, supra note
13, at 72-73. OMB, for example, excludes from its peer review policy for federal agencies any data
"[d]isseminated in the course of an individual agency adjudication or permit proceeding." Final
Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2677. Wagner also observes that "these
decisions rest in large part on unvalidated industry science," Wagner, Bad Science, supra note 13, at
73, which, if true, would make the case for applying regulatory peer review to them even stronger. It
is, therefore, this larger, but largely ignored universe of regulatory decisions that is the focus of this
Article.
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applications. Contrary to most scholarship on the topic, we argue that the
unavoidable confluence of science and policy that agencies confront does
not pose an insurmountable barrier to effective use of regulatory peer
review. Most of the debate over regulatory peer review centers on whether
agencies adequately practice science and, if not, whether peer review
could improve the quality of agency practices. But this reflects just one
side of the two-sided problem of how to meld science and policy, and we
agree that it is likely not where peer review would produce much gain.
Rather, we believe regulatory peer review is most effective when focusing
on how agencies apply science in support of their regulatory decisions.
The Klamath experience illustrates the difference: the Klamath Committee
did not criticize the way in which the agencies compiled data or the merits
of the final policy decision to close the floodgates; rather, the Klamath
Committee faulted the agencies for arguing that the data alone were
sufficient to support the decision without reliance on normative policy
judgments to fill any gaps. 27
When focused on the latter inquiry-the question of whether the
agency's claims of scientific support for its decision are justifiedregulatory peer review can help inform the public about where an agency's
use of science in support of a proposed decision ends and where its use of
professional judgment and normative policy choices begins. The standard
argument that agencies must make policy decisions in the face of
incomplete and uncertain scientific data, and thus should not be bound to
the rigors of peer review, turns the issue on its head. Designed wisely,
regulatory peer review can help reveal how much scientific uncertainty
underlies an agency decision and can thus demand that the agency explain
how the gap was filled. This function, we argue, can lead to greater
transparency in agency decision processes and greater legitimacy of
agency decisions in the eyes of the public, legislatures, and the courts.
Finally, in Part VI of the Article we move the debate forward by
evaluating different proposals currently under consideration for the design
of regulatory peer review and propose a way to take advantage of what
peer review has to offer without imposing undue demands on agency
resources. Regulatory peer review is a hot topic at the moment, with
agencies moving to implement OMB's recently promulgated policy and
Congress proposing yet more peer review requirements. These proposals,
however, are either over-inclusive, as are proposals in Congress to subject
virtually all ESA decisions to regulatory peer review, or under-inclusive,

27. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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as is OMB's policy limiting peer review to decisions of extreme economic
or other impact. The problem in each case is that, while there is good
reason to believe that regulatory peer review can serve salutary purposes
in administrative law, the scope of the problem is not competently
addressed. There is no evidence that all agency decisions suffer from the
Klamath syndrome, or that only the "big" ones are suspect.
Ironically, the scope of the problem cannot be assessed meaningfully
without peer review. Without conducting regulatory peer review one
cannot reasonably conclude whether agencies ought to be required to
conduct regulatory peer review, because no one knows how big a problem
agency misuse of science is. To a scientist, this dilemma has an easy
solution-the practice of random sampling. At present there is no
institutional structure in place for systematically reviewing the scientific
basis of regulatory decisions-i.e., for evaluating whether an agency's
claim that science gets it from point A to point B has a legitimate basis.
Hence, in order to assist policymakers in assessing the problem of
agencies' reliance on science in regulatory decisions, if there is one, we
propose the use of mandatory "randomized peer review" by agencies. A
small number of decisions in particular categories of agency actions would
be routinely subjected to peer review in order to determine whether more
frequent or widespread application of peer review for that class of actions
or for the agency as a whole is justified. This diagnostic, adaptive
approach has not been considered to date and, we argue, delivers the
greatest benefits of regulatory peer review while minimizing the costs.
II. WHAT IS PEER REVIEW AND WHERE IS IT USED?
The underlying premise for regulatory peer review boils down to
"what's good for science is good for regulation that relies on science."
This is an attractive turn of phrase, but it compares apples and oranges.
Promulgating a regulation for exposure to carcinogens, it goes without
saying, is not the same thing as finding the cure for cancer. Using science,
in other words, is not the same thing as doing science. In order to assess
whether the practice of peer review makes sense in regulatory settings,
then, we must first understand clearly the use and benefits of peer review
in science and how transferable these are.
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A. Conventional Applications of Scientific PeerReview

28

Peer review is most strongly associated with scientific journal
publication decisions, in which it has been in use for over 300 years, but it
is also employed in a wide array of settings, including grant-funding
decisions and faculty evaluations.2 9 Within science, peer review is widely
considered "essential to the integrity of scientific and scholarly
communication. 30 Indeed, for many scientists, peer review 31"does not
merely reflect the scientific method; it is the scientific method.",
When peer review is used in the context of journal publication and
grant-award decisions, the journal or granting institution acts as a
"middleman" to find independent reviewers with relevant expertise who
will review the science, not the scientists, and evaluate the merits of
publication. The journal review process has been summarized as follows:
[a]n aspiring author sends a manuscript to a journal's editorial
office. The journal editor, or for large journals one of the associate
editors, logs in the manuscript, selects two or three reviewers to
evaluate the manuscript, and sends each a copy. Reviewers are
asked to assess the manuscript and make a recommendation to
accept, accept with revisions, or reject the manuscript. The editor or
associate editors 3then
decide if they will accept the recommendation
2
of the reviewers.
Grant-funding peer review follows a similar process.33 In both cases,
the procedures seek to ensure "a documented, critical review performed by

28. This discussion of the use and perception of peer review in science also appears in
substantially the same form in Ruhl, supra note 25, at 407-09.
29. See ANN C. WELLER, EDITORIAL PEER REVIEW: ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 1-7
(2001).
30. Id. at 322.
31. Noah, supra note 25, at 1045.
32. WELLER, supra note 29, at 1; see also FYTTON ROWLAND, THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS: A
REPORT TO THE JISC SCHOLARLY COMMUNICATIONS GROUP 1 (2002), http://www.jisc.ac.uk/
uploaded documents/rowland.pdf (JISC is the Joint Information Systems Committee, the UK's higher
education support agency). Rowland states:
[w]hen a submitted report first arrives at the editorial office of a journal, it is first vetted by
the editor, who may reject it out of hand-either because it is "out of scope" (not dealing with
the right subject matter for that journal) or because it is manifestly of such low quality that it
cannot be considered at all. Papers that pass this first hurdle are then sent to experts in the
field of the paper-usually two-who are generally asked to classify the paper as publishable
immediately, publishable with amendments and improvements, or not publishable.

Id.
33. For example, the National Science Foundation advises persons submitting grant proposals as
follows:
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peers ... who are independent of the work being reviewed. 3 4 The quality
of the reviewers is central to any peer review. Ideally, one selects
reviewers who have demonstrated relevant expertise, independence, and
freedom from conflicts of interest. 35
Substantively, the peer review process is not a "de novo" review, to
borrow from a legal model, but rather more like appellate review. The
journal Ecology, for example, advises its reviewers that their comments
should address ten factors: (1) importance and interest to this journal's
readers; (2) scientific soundness; (3) originality; (4) degree to which
conclusions are supported; (5) organization and clarity; (6) cohesiveness
of argument; (7) length relative to information content; (8) whether
material should be moved to the digital appendices; (9) conciseness and
writing style; and (10) appropriateness for the targeted journal and specific
section of the journal.36 Yet even when a peer reviewer employs all of
these criteria, the intensity of journal and grant peer review is nothing like
de novo review. There is no independent research to verify whether the
data are accurate. Ecology explains, for example, that in assessing
"scientific soundness" the reviewer should examine the methods, data
presentation, and statistical design and analyses of the paper, but the
instructions do not include engaging in independent data authentication.3 7

[p]roposals received by the NSF Proposal Processing Unit are assigned to the appropriate
NSF program for acknowledgement and, if they meet NSF requirements, for review. All
proposals are carefully reviewed by a scientist, engineer, or educator serving as an NSF
Program Officer, and usually by three to ten other persons outside NSF who are experts in the
particular fields represented by the proposal. Proposers are invited to suggest names of
persons they believe are especially well qualified to review the proposal and/or persons they
would prefer not review the proposal. These suggestions may serve as one source in the
reviewer selection process at the Program Officer's discretion. Program Officers may obtain
comments from assembled review panels or from site visits before recommending final action
on proposals. Senior NSF staff further review recommendations for awards.
NAT'L SCIENCE FOUNDATION, GRANT PROPOSAL GUIDE 35 (2003), available at http://www.nsf.gov/

pubs/2003/nsf03O4l/nsfO3_04.pdf. Variations exist with respect to whether the journal or grant
institution uses reviewers from a standing board or selects reviewers from a list compiled by
recommendations. See WELLER, supranote 29, at 2.
34. THE DEP'T OF ENERGY'S OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH ET AL., supra note 18, at 2; see supra note

18 and accompanying text.
35. WELLER, supra note 29, at 207. Of course, even reviewers who meet these criteria may have
personal biases about approaches to or disputes in the particular scientific discipline, and there is no
objective way of de-biasing review panels from this effect. See Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the
Interpretationand Use of Research Results, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 259, 277 (1998).
36. Ecological Soc'y of Am. Publ'ns Office, Guidelines for Reviewers (Dec. 9, 2005),
http://www.esapubs.org/esapubs/reviewers.htm. These criteria are representative of the scientific
journal industry in general. See WELLER, supra note 29, at 160-66.
37. Ecological Soc'y of Am. Publ'ns Office, supra note 36. As Holly Doremus has explained,
"[p]eer reviewers are not expected to authenticate the data presented to them. Rather, their role is to
evaluate the methods employed and the facial plausibility of the conclusions drawn." Holly Doremus,
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Indeed, peer review would grind itself and journal publication to a
screeching halt were it to require peer reviewers to engage in independent
testing and data analysis.
While not nearly as probing as a de novo analysis, it is widely believed
that this "appellate style" peer review provides tremendous benefits.38
First, peer review serves as a filter, ensuring quality control. Knowing
their articles will be evaluated by peers, submitting authors have a strong
incentive to ensure their conclusions are supported by the data. Second,
peer review prioritizes, allowing editors and grant makers to rank articles
and proposals. In the face of more articles or grant proposals submitted
than can be published or funded, peer review provides an effective means
of winnowing the competition.
While less widespread than in scientific publications or grant making,
peer review is also employed by a number of federal agencies that have
primarily science-based missions. A 1999 study by the General
Accounting Office (GAO), for example, found widespread peer review
employed by science agencies such as the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and the National Institutes of Health.39 Peer review was
used for many purposes, ranging from grant awards and pre-publication
review of research to budget review and program and employee
evaluation. 40 These procedures were ad hoc, with no uniform definitions
or procedures, and ranged from outside mail reviewers and workshops to
internal and external standing panels. 4 ' Similar studies have documented
how agencies use (or do not use) peer review to fulfill science-based
missions. 42

Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn 't Always Better Policy,

75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1147 (1997).
38. There is some empirical evidence in support of this belief See WELLER, supra note 29, at 51,
53.
39. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-99-99, FEDERAL
PRACTICES AT FEDERAL SCIENCE AGENCIES VARY 1-10 (1999).

RESEARCH:

PEER REVIEW

40. Some specific examples of agency uses of peer review include NOAA competitive research
proposals, Agricultural Research Service project plans, and National Institutes of Health reviews of
at 18, 39, 53.
intramural research. Id.
41. Id. at 4-7.
42. See PANEL ON PEER REVIEW, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR WATER
RESOURCES

PROJECT

PLANNING

19-31,

app.

D

(2002),

available at

http://www.nap.edu/

openbook/030908508X/html (describing procedures used by the Army Corps of Engineers, EPA, the
Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Transportation); Subcomm. on Water Res. and Env.
of the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, Independent Peer Review of Products that Support
Agency Decision-Making, http://www.house.gov/transportation/water/03-05-03/03-05-03memo. html
(last visited Mar. 31, 2006) (describing peer review practices of EPA, the Fish and Wildlife Service,
and the Army Corps of Engineers).
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B. Extending Peer Review to Regulation
The use of peer review is far more limited and variable by agencies
when exercising regulatory responsibilities. There is a strong tradition of
expert advisory panels advising agencies on specific policy topics, ranging
from the Environmental Protection Agency's Science Advisory Boards to
the Food and Drug Administration's Technical Advisory Committees.43
Peer review is used much less frequently for discrete regulatory decisions
such as standard setting, and almost never in permitting and licensing.44
One reason for this, presumably, is that discrete regulatory decisions are
where policy meets the real world, and thus peer review would involve an
assessment of how an agency used available scientific data in reaching a
particular application of policy, rather than a scientific decision about
whether a research hypothesis is confirmed by data.
Using peer review in a regulatory context would thus require adapting
conventional scientific peer review in three respects. First, it will often be
the case that the agency is not actually doing the science that produces the
data upon which it relies for its decision, but rather uses data already
available through other scientific research efforts. Thus, regulatory peer
review will need to address how the agency incorporated pre-existing
scientific knowledge into its own decision processes. Second, it will not
always be the case that the data upon which the agency relies are the result
of peer-reviewed studies.45 Regulatory peer review, therefore, will need to
provide some assessment of those studies in the form of an evaluation of
the agency's choices over which data to use. Finally, many regulatory
decisions are not simply extensions of the scientific method-i.e., they
involve using science to inform, but not control, the exercise of the
agency's professional policy judgment. Regulatory peer review thus would
have to be mindful that, in getting from point A to point B, an agency may
have the discretion or the mandate to rely on an integration of science and
other policy factors, whereas the peer review must be limited to the
science alone.
To make these distinctions more concrete, it is helpful to revisit the
context of the Klamath and the ESA. The ESA is a science-based statute

43. For information on EPA's Science Advisory Board, see Envtl. Prot. Agency, About the EPA
Science Advisory Board, http://www.epa.gov/sab/about.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2006). For
information on the FDA's Advisory Committees, see Carol Rados, Advisory Committees: Critical to
the FDA's ProductReview Process,FDA CONSUMER, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 17.
44. See supra note 26.
45. Indeed, as Wendy Wagner points out, case-specific regulatory decisions usually rely, at least
in part, on "unvalidated industry science." Wagner, Bad Science, supra note 13, at 73.
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46
dedicated to conserving and restoring populations of endangered species;
as a result, it provides numerous opportunities for agency officials to rely
on scientific data in a policy setting.47 Section 4 of the Act, for example,
authorizes the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to identify "endangered" and
"threatened" species,
known as the listing function, 48 and then to designate
"critical habitat,, 49 and to develop "recovery plans" for the species. 50

Section 7 requires all federal agencies to ensure that actions they carry out,
fund, or authorize do not "jeopardize" the continued existence of listed
species or "result in the destruction or modification" of their critical
habitat.51 Section 9 requires that all persons, including all private and
public entities subject to federal jurisdiction, avoid committing takings of
listed species of fish and wildlife. 52 Sections 7 (for federal actions) and 10

46. See 16U.S.C. § 1531(b).
47. We each have had the pleasure of being asked to make presentations and write commentary
for publication about the ESA more than several times. Out of necessity, the materials in this
"background" section of this Article are a variation, tailored for the instant purposes, of a template one
of us has developed and used to inform readers not familiar with the ESA of the statute's basic
structure. Similar treatments, in other words, appear elsewhere. See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 25, at 41217. Like the other work, this Article is not intended to provide a comprehensive overview of the ESA.
Rather, it uses the ESA in this section as a case study for understanding how peer review would
operate in regulatory contexts. For comprehensive treatments of the ESA, several of which are referred
to frequently infra, see MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
WILDLIFE LAW (3d ed., 1997); ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES
(Donald C. Baur & Wm.Robert Irvin eds., 2002) [hereinafter LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES];
LAWRENCE R. LIEBESMAN AND RAFE PETERSEN, ENDANGERED SPECIES DESKBOOK (2003);
STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC'Y, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2001); TONY A. SULLINS, ESA:
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2001).

48.

16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2000). For a description of the listing process, see LIEBESMAN &

PETERSEN, supra note 47, at 15-20; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC'Y, supra note 47, at 38-58;
SULLINS, supra note 47, at 11-25; J.B. Ruhl, Section 4 of the ESA: The Keystone of Species Protection
Law, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 47, at 19.

49. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (2000). For a description of the critical habitat designation process,
see LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 47, at 20-24; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC'Y, supra note 47,
at 59-69; SULLINS, supra note 47, at 26-28; Federico Cheever, Endangered Species Act: Critical
Habitat, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 47, at 47; Murray D. Feldman & Michael J.
Brennan, The Growing Importance of CriticalHabitatfor Species Conservation, 16 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV'T 88 (2001). See also infra Part V.B.
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (2000). For a description of the recovery plan process, see LIEBESMAN &
PETERSEN, supra note 47, at 24-26; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC'Y, supra note 47, at 71-77;
SULLINS, supra note 47, at 34-37; John M. Volkman, Recovery Planning, in LAW, POLICY, AND
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 47, at 71.
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). For a description of the consultation process, see LIEBESMAN
& PETERSEN, supra note 47, at 27-39; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC'Y, supra note 47, at 83-103;
SULLINS, supra note 47, § 5; Marilyn Averill, ProtectingSpecies Through Interagency Cooperation, in
LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 47, at 87.

52. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2000). For a description of the cases developing the legal standards
for what constitutes "take," see LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 47, at 39-45; STANFORD ENVTL.
LAW SOC'Y, supra note 47, at 104-12; SULLINS, supra note 47, at 44-54; Alan M. Glen & Craig M.
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(for actions not subject to section 7) establish a procedure and criteria
for
53
FWS and NOAA to approve "incidental" takings of listed species.
Each of these provisions involves an intersection between policy
decisions and scientific determinations. In the standard-setting role of
listing species, for example, FWS and NOAA must decide whether a
species is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of
its range (endangered) or whether it is likely to become so in the
foreseeable future (threatened). 54 This requires a series of scientific

determinations about the taxonomy of the species-if indeed it is a
species55-its range, the present and threatened injuries to its habitat,
whether it is being over-utilized for commercial purposes or threatened by

disease or predation, whether these threats are enough to cause it to go
extinct, and, if so, when. 56 A similar law-science confluence appears in
policy application settings such as enforcement of the jeopardy prohibition
found in section 7,57 which was the driving legal standard in the Klamath
River conflict. 58 The statute requires FWS and NOAA to assess whether
the direct and indirect effects of a proposed federal agency action will

Douglas, Taking Species: Difficult Questions of Proximity and Degree, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T
65 (2001); Gina Guy, Take Prohibitionsand Section 9, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 47, at 191; Steven P. Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist, When Do Land Use Activities "Take"
Listed Wildlife Under ESA Section 9 and the "Harm" Regulation?, in LAW, POLICY, AND
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 47, at 207.
53. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(4), 1539(a)(1) (2000). An incidental taking, although not the subject of
a specific statutory definition provision, is described in section 10 as a taking that is "incidental to, and
not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity." § 1539(a)(1)(B). The FWS and
NOAA have adopted this meaning for purposes of the regulations implementing section 7. 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.02 (2005). For a description of the incidental take authorization procedures, see LIEBESMAN &
PETERSEN, supra note 47, at 46-50; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC'Y, supra note 47, at 127-73;
SULLINS, supra note 47, at 87-102.
54. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6), (20) (2000).
55. For a comprehensive comparison of the biological and legal conceptions of "species," see
Blake Hood, Transgenic Salmon and the Definition of "Species" Under the Endangered Species Act,
18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 75, 78-98 (2002). Hood notes, "[t]he scientific consensus on 'species' ..
. is that no complete consensus exists and that different definitions suit different purposes." Id. at78.
The default position in science as to what constitutes a species relies on Ernst Mayr's "biological
species concept," which focuses on reproductive isolation. Id. at 81-82. Still, actually defining the
boundaries of a species and deciding whether a particular organism belongs to one or another involves
complex observational, morphological, and genetic considerations. See id. at 82-83. For additional
discussion of the debate surrounding how to define a species, both legally and scientifically, see
LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 47, at I1-15; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC'Y, supra note 47, at
31-38; SULLINS, supra note 47, at 6-11; Doremus, supra note 37, at 1087-112. Several cases turn on
whether FWS or NOAA has correctly defined what constitutes a species within the meaning of the
statute. See LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 47, at 11-15 (providing comprehensive discussion
about definition of species).

56.

16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2000).

57.

§ 1536(a)(2) (requiring agencies to ensure no agency action jeopardizes a listed species).

58.

See Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 1,at 319-20.
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jeopardize the continued existence of the species 59 by appreciably
reducing its chances of recovery and survival in the wild. 60 To reach a
decision on that question, FWS and NOAA must determine as a scientific
matter the nature and magnitude of the impact the action will have on
reproduction, numbers, or distribution of the species, and how much any
such impacts will reduce the chances of the species surviving and
recovering in the wild.6 1
Clearly, regulatory agencies such as FWS and NOAA cannot easily
avoid the science component of their mandates in regulatory applications.
Indeed, to manage these and other necessary scientific judgments under
the ESA, the statute mandates that agencies apply a "best scientific data
available" standard. For example, when deciding whether to list a species,
FWS and NOAA must consider factors such as loss of habitat using only
"the best scientific and commercial data available."' 62 Similarly, the
biological component of the decision whether to designate critical habitat
must use the "best scientific data available., 63 And the "no jeopardy" and
"no adverse modification" directives to federal agencies, which rely on a
case-specific consultation procedure between the action agency and ESA
agency with jurisdiction over the species in question, 64 adopt the same
standard.65
While these provisions clearly infuse a science-based mandate into the
agencies' regulatory functions, they just as clearly provide that the
agencies will use science rather than do science.66 As described earlier,
peer review is normally associated more with the latter-with the actual
practice of science and presentation and defense of scientific
conclusions.6 7 Regulatory agencies generally do not engage in original
68
scientific research to make regulatory decisions. Perhaps they have
decided that so long as they rely on peer-reviewed science, subjecting their
decisions to a second layer of peer review would be redundant.
Indeed, few regulatory agencies ever subject their regulatory decisions
to peer review, and those that do usually limit the practice to standard-

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
(D.D.C.
67.
68.

See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2).
See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005) (defining jeopardy).
See id.
§ 1533(b)(1)(A).
§ 1533(b)(2).
§ 1536(a)(2), (b)-(c).
§ 1536(c); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8) (2005).
See Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, No. 98-934, 2002 WL 1733618, at *9
July 29, 2002).
See supra Part I.A.
See infra Part M.A.
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setting decisions. 69 For example, under a policy FWS and NOAA adopted
in 1994 with respect to species-listing decisions, the agencies promise to
70
"incorporate independent peer review in listing and recovery activities."
Notably, the policy does not apply to any of the agencies' action-specific
permitting authorities, such as jeopardy consultations under section 7 or
incidental take-permitting under sections 7 and 10 of the statute. 7' This
goes farther than most regulatory agencies have been willing to consider,
yet does not reach what Congress and the White House would require. 72

III. THE CASE FOR PEER REVIEW
Despite the controversy over mandating regulatory peer review, both
sides agree on the overall goal-regulatory agencies that make decisions
based in whole or in part on scientific research should seek to ensure their
decisions accurately interpret and employ the research results. Improving
agency decision making is hardly a new concern, of course. Indeed, many
methodologies to ensure sound agency decisions are already firmly
embedded in the basic standards of administrative law prescribed under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).7 3 These rules require the courts
to apply considerable deference to the agency's decision. A reviewing
court may not substitute its judgment for the agency but must undertake a
"thorough, probing, in-depth review" of the agency's decision. 74 Thus, a
court will reject an agency's decision if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law., 75 An agency
decision is arbitrary and capricious if the agency either has relied on
factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider
an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so

69. See Noah, supranote 25, at 1034-37, 1050-57.
70. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy
for Peer Review in Endangered Species Act Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,270, 34,270 (July 1, 1994).
This process, they explain, will involve "[s]olicit[ing] the expert opinions of three appropriate and
independent specialists regarding pertinent scientific or commercial data and assumptions relating to
the taxonomy, population models, and supportive biological and ecological information for species
under consideration for listing." Id. We assess the results of this ESA peer review in Part IV.B, infra.
71. See id. For example, neither FWS nor NOAA instituted peer review for their respective
decisions in the Klamath controversy.
72. See infra Part IlI.C.
73. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2000).
74. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,415 (1971).
75. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84:1

implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or
the product of agency expertise,7 6
or if it has failed to "articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including7 a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice
,,7
made.

A scientist would be accused of practicing unsound science in research
if he or she declared that relevant data were ignored or altered in reaching
the research conclusion simply because the data did not support the
conclusion. 78 Likewise, under the foregoing rules of judicial review an
agency would be chastised for doing the same in reaching rulemaking or
adjudication decisions. Such misuse of scientific data would be arbitrary
and capricious, and any court reviewing the decision would know to strike
it down as a violation of the APA. 79 A court would not need to employ
new principles or methodologies to justify such a ruling.
This is a powerful rebuttal to the general advocacy of "sound science"
for agency decision making, but it does not adequately respond to
arguments for using regulatory peer review to identify cases in which, as
in the Klamath, an agency uses properly assembled scientific data but
reaches a policy decision not supported by the data. Recall that the
available fisheries data did not provide a clear basis for concluding that
reduced water levels would jeopardize the endangered fish populations. 80
The policy decision to halt irrigation flows was not a misuse of science,
but it certainly was not dictated by the science either. Such a decision
could result from an agency's innocent misunderstanding of the science or
from its lack of expertise. Or, of course, it could result from an agency's
deliberate attempt to stretch the available science in support of its policy
decision farther than is justified. Whether innocent or deliberate, this kind
of misuse of science does not necessarily lead to poor policy decisions.
After all, agencies may have no choice but to extrapolate from incomplete
data when a decision needs to be made at that moment. It can raise

76. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
77. Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
78. See, e.g., Donald Kennedy, Editorial, Retraction, 311 SCi. 335 (2006) (editor of Science
retracts article journal published on stem cell research because of fabricated data); Gretchen Vogel et
al., Ecologists Roiled by Misconduct Case, 303 SCI. 606 (Jan. 30, 2004) (reporting developments
concerning allegations that a world-renowned ecologist fabricated data in a published study of genetic
fitness traits).
79. See, e.g., N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 482-83 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (holding
the decision not to list the owl was arbitrary and capricious in light of the biologists' findings).
80. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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concerns, however, if an agency justifies its decision to the public, courts,
and legislature as being driven chiefly by the science when it is in fact
based on a policy judgment informed by inconclusive science.
Whether an agency's overreliance on data is intentional or not, the
APA's procedural safeguards are unlikely to be an effective safeguard
when no overt suppression or manipulation of data is involved. Interested
parties may argue that the agency has oversold its science, but, as
interested parties, they may be equally guilty of that offense. Faced with
competing versions of what the available science means, a court is in no
position to conduct a reliable peer review and would thus lean decidedly
toward deferring to the agency's version, as it must under the APA.
Regulatory peer review therefore may have something to offer in such
cases, which, given the scientific uncertainty present in many regulatory
decisions, may be quite common.
Peer review, however, is neither mandated by most environmental laws
nor required through the default administrative law doctrines of the APA.
Procedures with some of the attributes of regulatory peer review are
already present in conventional administrative law processes, but these fall
short of peer review's promise. Public participation in regulatory
rulemaking decisions through notice and comment and in adjudicatory
proceedings through representation, for example, provide forms of outside
review. 8' But they are neither limited to experts nor do they screen out
biased members of the public. 82 Indeed, quite the opposite is likely-one
can reasonably expect that only members of the public with a personal
stake in the matter will be prone to get involved. After all, if one does not
have a vested interest in the regulation, why bother to get involved?
Judicial review of agency decisions ensures a close review by an
ostensibly unbiased party, but it cannot approach the same level of
expertise provided by peer review. Moreover, judges must adhere to the
review standards of the APA, not those of scientific peer review.83 Peer
review, in other words, is the one clear demand of the "sound science"
movement that administrative law does not already require.
Still, that regulatory peer review is not already required hardly compels
the case for requiring it. So why do it? What benefits does peer review
offer regulation that other procedural safeguards do not? The promised

81. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 553-54 (2000).
82. See Noah, supra note 25, at 1074-76. OMB makes the point, in its final peer review policy,
that "[p]eer review should not be confused with public comment and other stakeholder processes."
Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664, 2665 (Jan. 14, 2005).
83. See 16 U.S.C. § 706 (2000); Noah, supranote 25, at 1076-77.
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benefits of integrating peer review into the regulatory decision making
process are both substantive and procedural. Advocates argue that
providing independent expert feedback will generally improve the quality
of regulatory decisions.84 Like Representative Walden's folksy reference
to a doctor's second opinion, 85 in its initial proposal for mandatory peer
review OMB asserted that "peer review can provide a vital second opinion
on the science that underlies federal regulation., 86 Proponents also argue
that the use of independent, outside experts in regulatory peer review
should enhance the legitimacy of the regulatory process by reducing the
appearance of agency bias and conflict of interest.8 7
Other than pointing to the Klamath experience, however, what
theoretical or empirical support do advocates of regulatory peer review
advance for the claim that what is good for science is good for regulation?
This section lays out the central chain of reasoning behind leading
regulatory peer review proposals. There are, in fact, good reasons to
believe that agencies face institutional biases and pressures that could
systematically lead employees to overstate how much the available science
supports a particular policy decision. In addition, our survey revealed that
practitioners of environmental law working primarily in the private sector
harbor a deep distrust of agencies in this regard, a distrust based, we
presume, not primarily on political theory but on personal perspective and
practical experience. The push for regulatory peer review in Congress and
the White House has clearly been in response to these perceived defects in
agency process.
A. InstitutionalTheory
A key assumption underlying regulatory peer review proposals is that
there is a problem that needs to be fixed-agencies often, perhaps
systematically, present scientific data as supporting a policy decision more
than is justified. To be sure, some advocates of peer review support this
assertion with no more than a basic distrust of government and regulation.
But political science theory suggests why, quite apart from anti-regulatory
agendas, one might be concerned over agency use of science.

84. See Lars Noah, Peer Review and Regulatory Reform, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.)
10,606, 10,608 (2000).
85. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
86. Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023, 54,024
(Sept. 15, 2003).
87. Id.
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There is an immense literature on the institutional challenges inherent
in agency operation, and many of these theories explain why agencies88
might selectively use scientific data in a biased or incomplete manner.
The theory of agency mission focus, for example, asserts that singlemission agencies tend zealously to further their statutory missions in a
single-minded fashion. 89 This is a variant on the theories of agency
capture and public choice, in which the agency comes to view furthering
the interests of the regulated community as more important to its mission
than protecting the more amorphous public interest. 90
Personal bias can also play a role. Most biologists who work for the
FWS or NOAA, one could reasonably imagine, care personally about
conserving wildlife-that is why they became wildlife biologists and have
devoted their careers to working in an agency dedicated to wildlife
conservation. If the neutrality of agency biologists is not to be trusted, this
argument suggests-and this is clearly an underlying premise of the
"sound science" movement-it is because they are agency biologists with
"shared biases," not because they are simply biologists. 9 1
Finally, and perhaps most important, agencies work in an environment
of serious resource and time constraints. The conclusion of the Klamath
Committee, for example, was not that the agency decisionmakers
dissembled or acted in bad faith. One need not adopt a cynical view of
agency behavior to understand why the exigencies of making complicated
decisions in a short period based on uncertain or conflicting data can
92
sometimes lead to decisions with inadequate scientific support.
Sympathy for agencies may be due on this score; nevertheless, time and
resource constraints do appear to be yet one more reason to believe that
agencies may reach decisions that lack a firm scientific basis.
Arguing against the use of peer review in regulatory agencies,
therefore, invites accusations of trying to obscure the flaws of agency
practice. Advocates of peer review contend that it is the light that will
expose those flaws, leading to the improved quality of agency decisions

88. Wendy Wagner provides a comprehensive study of these institutional forces in the context of
science and policy. See Wagner, Science Charade,supra note 13, at 1650-73. See generally RICHARD
J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 1.7-1.10 (3d ed. 1999).
89. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 88, § 1.9.
90. Id. § 1.7.2.

91.

Id.§ 1.9.

92.

The Klamath Committee recognized that "agencies may recommend practices for which the

committee would find virtually no direct scientific support. The committee acknowledges the necessity
of this practice in many situations where information is inadequate for development of scientifically
rigorous decisions." KLAMATH COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 35.
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and revealing the biases of agency decisionmakers. On the surface,
therefore, peer review may have something to offer administrative law in
general.
At the same time, regulatory peer review clearly imposes costs on
agencies that are already operating under tight resource constraints. One
can believe that agencies might portray science as doing more for their
policy decisions than is justified and that peer review will improve agency
decisions in this respect. But that alone does not provide compelling
justification for greater use of regulatory peer review, because it is just not
clear how many Klamaths are out there. Whether intentionally or as a
result of a good-faith mistakes, how frequently would agency regulatory
decisions purported to be based on science fail the test of peer review?
Without a sense of how big a problem this poses, advocates of regulatory
peer review cannot state with any confidence that its theoretical benefits
outweigh the actual costs of implementation.
B. EmpiricalAnalysis: Faith,Perceptions,and Demand
We know of no comprehensive empirical study comparing regulatory
decisions with and without peer review, attempting to reevaluate past
regulatory decisions using peer review methods, or estimating the costs of
broad-based regulatory peer review. Beyond political theory, in other
words, the case for regulatory peer review is based largely on faith-faith
in the gospel that agencies do in fact overstate how far their science carries
them.
Faith, however, is a powerful force when shared by a multitude. If
enough of the public believes agencies make poor use of science, that this
leads to policy failures, and that regulatory peer review is an effective
check on the problem, arguments for imposing regulatory peer review will
have traction. Even more compelling, if enough of those who share these
beliefs are experienced in administrative law and policy-can claim to
have practical experience with agency regulatory practices-then the
public is less likely to demand an empirical study of the issue before
supporting proposals to put regulatory peer review in place. Indeed, this is
precisely what our survey showed to be the case.
The survey was designed to elicit respondents' perceptions about the
performance of regulatory agencies, the merits of regulatory peer review,
and the design of regulatory peer review. 93 With respect to agency

93. The complete survey is available on request from the authors. We provided respondents the
following definition of regulatory peer review:
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performance, the survey posed a general question and many detailed ones
relating to different attributes of agency use of science. Responses
indicated a significant background level of concern over agency use of
science among experienced practitioners. 94 Indeed, in more detailed
questions, respondents revealed a deep mistrust of agency behavior. Figure
1 shows the percentage of responses to specific aspects of agency use of
science.
Figure 1. We asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they
agree or disagree that the following statements describe agency
resources and practices. Figures show percent of respondents in
each category.

Regulatory Peer Review is the outside evaluation of an administrative agency's search,
selection, or use of scientific data used to support a proposed regulatory decision (rule,
permit, or other policy). The evaluation is conducted prior to the agency's final decision by
one or more experts in the relevant field who are independent of the agency and have no
pecuniary or other conflict of interest with respect to the outcome of the agency's decision.
We sent the survey to 900 randomly selected members of the American Bar Association's Section of
the Environment, Energy, and Resources (SEER), of whom 158 responded with usable surveys. We
chose SEER because the leading edge of the regulatory peer review debate has focused on
environmental law and SEER is a prominent forum for practitioners of environmental law in private
practice, government, academic, and other practice settings. The survey was voluntary and responses
were anonymous. We greatly appreciate SEER's cooperation in providing the member names and their
contact information (SEER did not commission, direct, or in any other way influence the design or
implementation of the survey). All funding for the survey and the data analysis was provided by The
Florida State University (FSU) College of Law. We thank FSU Department of Statistics Professor KaiSheng Song and graduate student Han Yu for their assistance in compiling and analyzing the survey
data.
94. The general question asked respondents to state their level of agreement or disagreement with
the statement that "based on my experience, administrative agencies usually employ adequate
procedures for the search, selection, and use of scientific data in regulatory decision making."
Although 41% of respondents stated some level of agreement with the statement, 51% somewhat or
strongly disagreed.

[VOL. 84:1

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Somewhat
Strongly Somewhat No
Opinion Disagree
Agree
Agree
a. Agencies generally have sufficient time to
conduct adequate searches for and analyses of
scientific data relevant to their decisions.
b. Agencies generally have sufficient budgets
to conduct adequate searches for and analyses
of scientific data relevant to their decisions.
c. Agencies generally have sufficient expertise
to conduct adequate searches for and analyses
of scientific data relevant to their decisions.
d. Agencies generally place an adequate
priority on searching for scientific data
relevant to their decisions.
e. Agencies usually select data that have
adequate scientific reliability.
f. Agencies generally place appropriate
reliance on scientific data that support their
preferred decisions.
g. Agencies generally give appropriate
recognition to scientifically reliable data that
contradict their preferred decisions.
h. Agencies usually employ adequate
scientific analysis when using the data they
Ipresent as supporting their final decisions.

Strongly
Disagree

8

40

4

37

11

3

23

7

36

31

8

33

6

40

13

I
9

31

12

34

14

7

42

8

35

8

11

36

12

36

5

2

18

9

51

20

6

25

13

48

8

Unsurprisingly, and consistent with the institutional theory reviewed
above, many respondents indicated they believe that agencies face
significant time and resource constraints in their use of science (questions
a through c). More troublesome was the level of concern respondents
revealed about how agencies prioritize their search for data and about how
they select and rely on data in support of their decisions: almost half of the
respondents expressed negative perceptions of agency behavior (questions
d through f). Most startling, however, were the responses to the final two
questions in the series (questions g and h). Over 70% of respondents
disagreed, 20% strongly so, with the statement that agencies generally
give appropriate recognition to scientifically reliable data that contradict
their preferred decisions; 56% of respondents disagreed with the statement
that agencies usually employ adequate scientific analysis when using the
data they present as supporting their final decisions. The overall picture
these responses paint is that many experienced practitioners understand
that agencies face time and resource constraints in their use of science, but
even more believe agencies make poor use of what science they have at
their disposal, which leads to the potential overstatement of the scientific
support for their regulatory decisions.
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Of course, not all respondents felt this way, and the difference of
opinion is starkest when the backgrounds of respondents are considered. 95
Not surprisingly, respondents who indicated federal or state agency
government employment (combined in a regrouping designated as "Govt")
as their primary career experience, which made up 15% of the respondent
pool, were far more likely to hold favorable views of agency use of
science than were respondents with primarily private law firm or in-house
careers representing corporations (combined in a regrouping designated
"Corp"), which accounted for 73% of respondents. For example,
government respondents were over four times more likely than industry
respondents to agree with the general statement that agencies usually
employ adequate procedures. 96 Figure 2 shows how extensive this
difference of opinion was for each of the specific questions about agency
performance:

95. One of the underlying premises of proposals for regulatory peer review is that there is, or at
least may be, a prevalence of regulatory decisions that are not adequately grounded in scientific
support. We suspected that private sector attorneys may be more likely than public sector attorneys to
believe there is such a problem, and thus we grouped the respondent population based on whether the
respondent had practiced primarily in the private or public sector over the course of his or her career.
We designed our survey questions to obtain respondents' perceptions about a variety of topics that any
experienced environmental lawyer could find controversial and aligned with particular political and
economic interests. As such, we recognize that responses may be affected by factors such as whether
the respondent represents industry or government, believes in strong government or libertarian
principles, and so on. Lawyers that represent industry might have rushed to condemn agencies' use of
science in their responses, and lawyers representing government might have taken every opportunity to
praise them. That is the nature of qualitative perception surveys. As we explain in Parts II and IV of
the Article, as important as it is to know the actual performance of a regulatory agency in its use of
science, we believe it is also vital to understand perceptions of the need for and efficacy of regulatory
peer review, biased as they may be, because of the effect those perceptions will have on the demand
for regulatory peer review and in dictating acceptance of the agency's decisions.
96. Since the responses called for in our survey are clearly ordinal in nature, we used the logistic
regression method of statistical analysis for answering various questions of interest throughout our
study. For example, to determine the influence of government work on perceptions of regulatory peer
review, we treated the two practice setting categories as the explanatory variable X, and the responses
to perceptions of regulatory peer review were coded on a scale from I to k; for example, 1-5,
corresponding to strongly agree, somewhat agree, no opinion, somewhat disagree, and strongly
disagree. The score for each question was treated as the response variable Y and the k possible scores
of Y are called the response categories. The principal objective of a statistical analysis is to investigate
the relationship between the explanatory variable X and the response variable Y. The ordinal nature of
the responses leads naturally to statistical models based on the cumulative response probabilities of
observing response categories less than or equal to a given score j, when the covariate is X. More
specifically, we are interested in investigating the influence of the explanatory variable X on the
cumulative response probability up to and including category j. The logistic regression method of
examining such relationships involves modeling the logarithm of the odds of the event of observing
response categories up to and including category j as a function of the explanatory variable X through
a linear regression equation.
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Figure 2. The second column shows which group, federal or state
government career (Govt) or private firm or in-house corporate
career (Corp), was significantly more likely to agree with the
statement in the first column (i.e., to answer "strongly agree" or

"somewhat agree"), based on the breakdown between the two
groups who agreed (third and fourth columns). To indicate the
strength of the difference, if any, between the two groups, the fifth
column shows the odds that a person selected randomly from the
more likely group would agree with the statement compared to a
person selected randomly from the less likely group.
More Likely % agreeing that %agreeing that
to Agree
were Govt
were Corp
a. Agencies generally have sufficient time to
conduct adequate searches for and analyses

Odds

Neither

of scientific data relevant to their decisions.

b. Agencies generally have sufficient
budgets to conduct adequate searches for and
analyses of scientific data relevant to their
decisions.
c. Agencies generally have sufficient
expertise to conduct adequate searches for
and analyses of scientific data relevant to
their decisions.
d. Agencies generally place an adequate
priority on searching for scientific data
relevant to their decisions.
e. Agencies usually select data that have
adequate scientific reliability.
f. Agencies generally place appropriate
reliance on scientific data that support their
preferred decisions.
g. Agencies generally give appropriate
recognition to scientifically reliable data that
contradict their preferred decisions.
h. Agencies usually employ adequate
scientific analysis when using the data they
present as supporting their final decisions.

Govt

70

30

5.7:1

Govt

64

36

3.3:1

Govt

63

37

2.9:1

Govt

60

40

2.2:1

Govt

75

25

8.8:1

Govt

71

29

Neither

6.3:1
I

Ironically, agency attorneys revealed less concern than did industry
attorneys about the adequacy of agency time and resources. With respect
to agency behavior, however, agency attorneys fell in line with
institutional theory in expressing tremendous support for agency
performance-far more so than did the industry attorneys. Moreover, with
government attorneys accounting for most of the favorable opinion of
agency performance (notwithstanding their lower representation numbers
in the survey), the negative perception of agency use of science among
industry attorneys was remarkably deep and broadly shared.
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Our survey reveals a sharp difference of opinion between agency
lawyers and lawyers representing industry about agency use of science.
Interest groups associated with environmental causes, however, also hold
to the faith that agencies may not adequately ground their decisions in
science. Studies have shown that support for peer review under the ESA,
for example, is strong in both the industry and the environmental camps,
but such support is almost always limited to applying review to the types
of decisions each interest group finds the most troublesome. Dr. Deborah
Brosnan has found, for example, that more than sixty prominent lobbying
groups representing a diverse array of interests actively supported using
peer review under the ESA, but that "each group favors review of actions
that it finds unpalatable. Development groups want fewer species listings
and therefore demand review of listing decisions.... Environmental
groups are concerned about
habitat loss under HCPs and want them
' 97
independently reviewed.

Indeed, in recent years some of the most vocal critics of agency use of
science are scientists and environmental groups, who have made
widespread allegations that political appointees in the Bush administration
have forced agency scientists to manipulate, suppress, and distort scientific
data. 98 One group of prominent scientists endorsed a statement accusing
the Bush Administration in general of misusing science. 99 Democratic
members of Congress have produced reports accusing agencies of
intentional suppression and distortion of scientific data °° and of practicing
"weird science."' 0 ' Even scientists within NOAA have recently claimed
that they have witnessed outright suppression and distortion of science
within their agency. 0 2 In short, the perception that agencies rely on
inadequate scientific support for their decisions has begun to transcend
neat political boxes.

97. Deborah M. Brosnan, Can Peer Review Help Resolve Natural Resource Conflicts?, 16
ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 32, 33 (2000).

98. See generally MOONEY, supra note 13, at 14-24, 78-248.
99. See Union of Concerned Scientists, Scientific Integrity Statement Signatories, http://www.
ucsusa.org/RSI list/index.php (last visited apr. 2, 2006). For the scientists' statement, see Union of
Concerned Scientists, Restoring Scientific Integrity in Policymaking (Feb. 18, 2004), http://www.
ucsusa.org/scientific-integrity/interference/scientists-signon-statement.html.
100. See MINORITY STAFF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS Div., H. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM,
POLITICS AND SCIENCE IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2003), available at http://www.house.gov/
reform/min/politicsandscience/pdfs/pdfi-politics -andscience_rep.pdf.
101. See DEMOCRATIC STAFF, H. COMM. ON RES., WEIRD SCIENCE: THE INTERIOR
DEPARTMENT'S MANIPULATION OF SCIENCE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES (2002), available at
http://www.ourforests.org/weirdscience.pdf.

102. See Officials, Scientists Spar over Whether Politics Trumps Science at NMFS, ENDANGERED
SPECIES & WETLANDS REP., June 2005, at 14, 14.
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It is not surprising that different denominations share the faith that
agencies sometimes oversell the extent to which science supports their
decisions. Regulatory agencies deal with so many issues affecting so many
interest groups that an agency will eventually offend almost every interest
group with whom it deals enough times to raise the group's concern over
the use of science in decisions that went against them. Perhaps in each
matter it depends on whose ox the agency gores, but over time, if the
agency gores everyone's ox, the reliability of agency use of science can
become fair game for all. But the breadth of this perception does not itself
explain the extensive support for regulatory peer review. Here again,
however, we found what appears to be a strong set of beliefs in the merit
of regulatory peer review and what it could accomplish. Figure 3 shows
the extent to which practitioners of environmental law view regulatory
peer review as an answer to the perceived misuse of science by agencies:
Figure 3. We asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they
agree or disagree with the following statements about the potential
effects of applying regulatory peer review to proposed regulatory
decisions. Figures show the percent of respondents in each category.
Strongly Somewhat
No
Somewhat
Agree
Agree
Opinion Disagree
a. It is likely to lead to substantial
improvements in the quality of agency
decisions.
b. It is likely to reveal significant flaws in
the ways agencies generally search for,
select, or use scientific data.
c. It is likely to improve public confidence
in agency decisions.

Strongly
Disagree

28

46

15

9

2

25

41

14

17

3

28

42

16

11

3

The perception that regulatory peer review is the answer to agency
misuse of science appears to be overwhelming, with well over 65%
agreeing that it will improve the quality of agency decisions, expose flaws
in agency use of science, and improve public confidence in agencies, and
only 20% or less disagreeing that each of those expected benefits will
accrue. Yet, given how little regulatory peer review is employed today in
agency practice, what is the foundation for this set of beliefs?
Once again, it appears to be little more than faith, for most of our
respondents had never had direct contact with regulatory peer review.
Over 60% of our respondents had neither represented a client in a matter
undergoing regulatory peer review nor advocated about whether to adopt
regulatory peer review nor even counseled a client generally about what
regulatory peer review is. Indeed, as further support that views on
regulatory peer review are largely based on faith, we were not surprised to

2006]

IN DEFENSE OF REGULATORY PEER REVIEW

find that government and industry attorneys had different expectations
about the effects of regulatory peer review, as shown in Figure 4, though
we were shocked by the degree of disagreement.
Figure 4. The second column shows which group (federal or state
government career (Govt) or private firm/in-house corporate career
(Corp)), was significantly more likely to agree with the statement in
the first column (i.e., answer "strongly agree" or "somewhat
agree"), based on the breakdown between the two groups who
agreed (third and fourth columns). To indicate the strength of the
difference, if any, between the two groups, the fifth column shows
the odds that a person selected randomly from the more likely group
would agree with the statement compared to a person selected
randomly from the less likely group.
More Likely % agreeing that % agreeing that Odds
to Agree
were Govt
were Corp
a. It is likely to lead to substantial
improvements in the quality of agency
decisions
b. It is likely to reveal significant flaws in
the ways agencies generally search for,
select, or use scientific data
c. It is likely to improve public confidence
in agency decisions
I

Corp

16

84

33.3:1

Corp

22

78

12.5:1

Corp

19
I

81
I

Government attorneys, according to our results, simply do not buy into
the idea that regulatory peer review has anything salutary to offer their
work. But with industry attorneys twelve times more likely than agency
attorneys to believe regulatory peer review will expose flaws in agency
procedures, twenty times more likely to believe it will improve public
confidence in agencies, and thirty-three times more likely to believe it will
improve the quality of agency decisions, can agencies afford to ignore the
magnitude of pro-peer-review sentiment that appears to have taken hold
among those who practice before them?
C. Meeting the Demand
Our survey results suggest that demand for regulatory peer review is
strong among experienced practitioners of regulatory law, particularly
those who represent industry clients before agencies. Responding to that
demand, the Bush Administration has supported the policy that federal
agencies broadly employ more rigorous peer review in their decision
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making processes. 103 Indeed the centerpiece of the Bush Administration's
"sound science" push has been OMB's peer review policy. Based
ostensibly on authority granted in the Data Quality Act, 10 4 OMB's
approach requires federal agencies to conduct "a peer review of influential
scientific information" and of "highly influential scientific assessments"
an agency disseminates to the public. 0 5 In its initial September 2003
proposal, OMB claimed this mandate would "improve the quality,
objectivity, utility, and integrity of information disseminated by the
a vital
Federal Government to the public," because it would "provide
' 10 6
regulation."
federal
underlies
that
science
the
on
second opinion
07
OMB responded to a wide range of comments on its initial proposal
and published a revised proposal in April, 2004.08 Deleting its prior
assertion that regulatory peer review is tantamount to a "second opinion,"
OMB then asserted that peer review would evaluate:
the clarity of hypotheses, the validity of the research design, the
quality of the data collection procedures, the robustness of the
methods employed, the appropriateness of the methods for the
hypotheses being tested, the extent to which the conclusions follow
from the analysis, and the strengths and limitations of the overall
product. 109

103. See Revised Information Quality Bulletin on Peer Review, 69 Fed. Reg. 23,230, 23,230 (Apr.
28, 2004) ("[P]eer review improves both the quality of scientific information and the public's
confidence in the integrity of science."); Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality,
68 Fed. Reg. 54,023, 54,024 (Sept. 15, 2003) ("Independent, objective peer review has long been
regarded as a critical element in ensuring the reliability of scientific analyses.").
104. The Data Quality Act, also known as the Information Quality Act, is actually a set of
provisions embedded in a 2001 appropriations bill, and requires, among other things, that OMB "issue
guidelines ... that provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and
maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information ...disseminated by Federal
agencies .... consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515(a), 114 Stat. 2763,
2763A-153 to 54 (2000). For a history of the political figures and events that led to the Data Quality
Act, see MOONEY, supra note 13, at 102-20.
105. Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664, 2675 (Jan. 14, 2005).
Some observers have questioned OMB's authority to require peer review. See Shapiro, supra note 25,
at 10,064-65.
106. Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023, 54,023-24
(Sept. 15, 2003).
107. Public comments on the OMB Proposed Bulletin are posted at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/inforeg/2003iq/iq-list.html.
108. Revised Information Quality Bulletin on Peer Review, 69 Fed. Reg. at 23,230-31.
109. Id.at23,231.
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OMB received more comments on the revised policy," ° though far
fewer than on the original proposal, and adopted a final policy in
December 2004 with relatively minor refinements.' 1 ' Under the final
policy, agency information subject to review would include data, synthesis
of facts, models, analyses, and assessments that would "have a clear and
substantial impact on important public policies or private sector
decisions."' " 2 This could range from state of science reports, metaanalyses, and risk assessments to toxicity profiles and health and ecology
assessments.1 1 3 Not all science underpinning decisions can be peer
reviewed, of course, and OMB's strictest peer-review requirements are
reserved for science affecting decisions with $500 million of regulatory or
private-sector impact, novel, precedent-setting impact; or significant
interagency interest. 1 14 If the data have already been subject to adequate
115
peer review (e.g., journal review), no further review is needed.
Otherwise, the agency must apply internal or external peer review by
technical experts not associated with the work product and must provide a
summary or copy of comments to the public. 116 The agency must publicly
respond to the peer review report, and in some cases public 7comment and
hearing on the draft peer review report may be appropriate. "
On the legislative side, a series of "sound science" reform bills have
been proposed in Congress to amend the ESA. The Sound Science for
Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2002,8 introduced by
Representative James Hansen (R-Utah), is the genesis of a line of such
legislation that has followed in similar spirit. 119 In general, these proposals
would alter the procedures, standards of evidence, and burdens of proof
1 20
under which federal agencies operate in carrying out ESA programs.
The legislation would stiffen ESA procedures in many respects, requiring
FWS and NOAA to give preference to certain forms of evidence and apply

110. Public comments on the OMB Revised Bulletin are posted at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/inforeg/peer2004/list-peer2004.html.
111. Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664 (Jan. 14, 2005).
112. Id. at 2667.
113.

Id.

114. Id.at 2671.
115. Id.

116. Id.at2675.
117. Id. at 2672.
118. H.R. 4840, 107th Cong. (2002).
119. For a more recent version, see H.R. 1662, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 369, 108th Cong. (2003).
For a history of peer review provisions in ESA reform bills preceding H.R. 4840, see Michael J.
Brennan et al., Square Pegs and Round Holes: Application of the "Best Scientific Data Available'
Standardin the EndangeredSpecies Act, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 387, 433-40 (2003).

120. See Burke, supranote 8, at 506-07.
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more rigorous burdens of proof to a long list of specified decisions. 12 In
particular, the bills would require FWS and NOAA to give greater weight
to field-tested and peer-reviewed data, accept data from affected
landowners, solicit data on recovery plans, and, most important, subject
every listing, critical habitat, recovery plan, and consultation decision to
peer review by a three-expert panel.12 2 The resulting process would
institute a much more formal and probing peer review process for many
more ESA decisions than FWS imposed on itself under its internal 1994
policy.
review
peerThe
proposed
ESA reforms have enjoyed strong support 123 and
engendered equally strident criticism. 124 Testimony from agency officials
125
generally supported the reforms with only minor suggested changes.
The House Resources Committee held hearings on Representative
Hansen's bill in June 2002126 and reported it favorably on July 10, 2002,
in a 22-18 vote that largely followed party lines.127 Peer review proposals
28
like the ESA bills continue to have considerable traction in Congress. 1
OMB and Congress offer no empirical evidence for their rush to meet
the demand for regulatory peer review. But so what? The institutional
theory supporting the case for peer review is practically a given in
administrative law scholarship, 129 and the perception that agencies
overstate how far their science gets them appears to be widely held by
attorneys and interest groups that appear before regulatory agencies.' 30 In
politics, that is usually more than enough. The debate has not been one-

121. See H.R. 4840, 107th Cong. (2002) § 2.
122. Seeid. §§2-3.
123. See, e.g., NAT'L ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT REFORM COAL., H.R. 4840, the Sound Science
for Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2002, http://www.nesarc.org/walden.htm (last visited
Apr. 2, 2006) (providing links to several relevant sites).
124. See, e.g., Press Release, Defenders of Wildlife, Statement by Rodger Schlickeisen President
of Defenders of Wildlife on Committee Markup HR 4840, a Bill that Purports to Offer "Sound
Science" for ESA (July 11, 2002), http://www.defenders.org/releases/pr2002/prO7ll02.html (calling
the proposal "one more effort by the 'development at any environmental cost' crowd to gut the ESA").
125. See http://laws.fws.gov/testimon/2001/main200l.html (resonating that "sound science" has
become a theme across many programs in the Bush Administration).
126. "Sound Science for EndangeredSpecies Act PlanningAct of 2002 ": Hearingon H.R. 4840
Before the H. Comm. on Resources, 107th Cong. (2002).
127. See Press Release, Nat'l Endangered Species Act Reform Coal., ESA Victory: Sound Science
Legislation Passes House Resources Committee (July 11, 2002), http://www.nesarc.org/4840alert.pdf
(last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
128. See, e.g., H.R. 4940, 109th Cong. § 3 (2006); H.R. 5018, 109th Cong. § 3 (2006) (proposing
peer review for agency decisions about fisheries management).
129. See supra Part IIl.A.
130. See supra Part III.B.
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sided, however, for there are significant objections to imposing regulatory
peer review. These are explored in the next section.
IV. THE CASE AGAINST PEER REVIEW
Critics of mandating regulatory peer review have advanced two
positions: First, evidence that agencies frequently overstate the extent to
which science supports a regulatory decision is insufficient. Second,
absent such evidence, even if there is a problem, they argue, peer review is
not the solution but rather a practice to be avoided at all costs. Not only
will it fail to provide the promised benefits, they argue, but it will further
politicize the decision making process and slow the agency process to the
point of frustrating agencies' missions to protect the public welfare. They
may be right in some circumstances, but when examined closely these
arguments turn out to rest on simply a different faith than the one held by
the supporters of regulatory peer review.
A. There is No Problem
As discussed above, our survey revealed that attorneys representing
agencies tend to believe that regulatory agencies adequately describe the
scientific support for their regulatory decisions which, if true, means there
is no justification for adding the burden of regulatory peer review. To
evaluate this position carefully, however, it is critical to distinguish
between cases in which an agency produces or employs "bad science" and
cases in which an agency misuses "good science." For example, Wendy
Wagner asserts that "the examples of regulatory bad science are winnowed
down to a few, virtually all of which are contested." 1 3' This assertion
refers, however, to the quality of science an agency has produced or relied
on-e.g., whether the data were biased or whether the agency ignored
relevant data-not whether the agency has taken what might be perfectly
32
credible science and stretched it too far to support a policy decision.1
Moreover, studies of agency practices with respect to science do not cover
"the larger universe of regulatory decisions involving the grant of permits
and licenses,"' 133 which is, of course, a principal target of many current

131. Wagner, Bad Science, supra note 13, at 73; see Sidney Shapiro, The Case Against the IQA,
ENVTL. F., July/Aug. 2005, at 26, 28.
132. See Wagner, Bad Science, supra note 13, at 73-77. Of course, Wagner was the first to
comprehensively explore the institutional reasons why agencies may overstate the extent to which
science supports their policy decisions. See Wagner, Science Charade,supra note 13.
133. See Wagner, Bad Science, supra note 13, at 73.
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proposals for regulatory peer review. In fact, no critique of regulatory peer
review has presented empirical evidence based on systematic, objective
analysis of how accurately agencies apply science-perhaps perfectly
sound science-in this meaningful universe of regulatory decisions.
Hence, although there is substantial evidence that agencies do not
systematically produce or use flawed scientific evidence, there is almost
no empirical evidence on the question of how agencies use the available
credible science to support their policy decisions, particularly in
permitting and licensing decisions. Indeed, if the argument were simply
that there has been no comprehensive empirical examination of whether
and how often agencies overstate the support science lends to their policy
decisions, we would agree. As the previous section shows, however, such
an assertion is not an adequate rebuttal of the case for regulatory peer
review. One might argue that the burden is on advocates of regulatory peer
review to produce empirical proof that agencies frequently exhibit this
1 34
problem, in which case that burden unquestionably has not been met.
But why place the burden of empirical proof on the side that wishes to
apply a bedrock principle of science with a 300-year tradition to agencies
that base their decisions in whole or in part on science? Given how crucial
peer review is to the scientific method, given the institutional forces that
suggest agencies may often overstate how far science gets them, and given
the belief held by many industry and environmental interests alike that
agencies in fact do so, it is not unreasonable to expect critics of regulatory
peer review to demonstrate that what is good for science is ill-advised for
regulation. Observing that a data vacuum exists does not meet this burden.
B. If There Is a Problem, Peer Review Is Not the Solution
Our survey also revealed that attorneys representing agencies as the
primary focus of their careers generally do not believe regulatory peer
review can improve agency decisions or public confidence in them. This is
the fallback theme of most critiques of regulatory peer review. For
example, in response to OMB's initial proposal for regulatory peer review,
the American Association for the Advancement of Science issued a
resolution condemning the proposal on several grounds, including that
"there is no evidence that proposed new procedures are likely to improve

134.

Wagner points this out with respect to the charge that agencies practice poor science, see id.

at 76-79 (demonstrating "the failure of the reformers themselves to document a problem" with respect
to poor agency practice of science).
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the quality of science used in the regulatory process." 135 Of course, there is
no evidence regulatory peer review is unlikely to do so either. Yet, putting
aside the issue of which side bears the burden of proof in this regard, on
this score the critics of regulatory peer review have some strong
institutional reasons for suggesting caution in its use.
One concern is that advocates of regulatory peer review promise too
much and thus distort the public's expectations of agency practices. Recall
that Representative Walden and the OMB's initial peer review proposal
both portrayed regulatory peer review as a "second opinion."'' 3 6 That
sounds pretty attractive-after all, who would not want a second opinion
before amputating a limb? But peer review does not provide a second
opinion in the conventional sense. Medical doctors providing a second
opinion examine the patient, not just the other doctor's written diagnosis.
Scientists providing peer review for professional journals do not "examine
the patient" in the form of conducting independent experimentation or data
analysis. As Lars Noah has described, "policymakers often seem to
conflate peer review with science itself, which in turn may lead them to
exaggerate the possible
utility of independent expert scrutiny of decisions
' 137
based on science."
This concern is particularly acute in regulatory settings in which the
best available science is likely to prove inconclusive, forcing the agency to
rely on professional judgment to interpret the data and then, when
permitted or required, to employ other policy considerations to reach a
final decision. Regulatory peer review will not close the data gaps. 138 If
advocates of regulatory peer review suggest otherwise, they oversell to the
public what regulatory peer review really offers.
This leads to another concern-that, far from advocates' claims that
peer review will eliminate bias from agency decisions, it will actually
exacerbate these concerns by allowing agencies to mask their biases with
the veneer of science. Agencies themselves can misuse peer review. The
ESA provides a particularly illustrative example. FWS and NOAA have
long been criticized for operating a black-box style of decision makingrelatively closed to the public, reliant on informal channels of scientific
communication, and generally unwilling to communicate their data and

135. Am. Ass'n for the Advancement of Science AAAS Resolution: On the MB Proposed Peer
Review Bulletin (Mar. 9, 2004), http://archives.aaas.org/docs/resolutions.php?doc-id=434.
136. See supra notes 19, 86 and accompanying text.
137. Noah, supra note 25, at 1046.
138. Indeed, as we point out in Part V, if anything, regulatory peer review will expose the data
gaps and sharpen the differentiation between science and policy as the bases for agency decisions,
which we consider the strongest reason to use it.
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scientific reasoning in a manner that facilitates review by the public and
the courts. 139 The 1994 peer review policy, described earlier, 140 was
intended to fix that-to instill greater confidence in the public and the
courts. These agencies pledged to "incorporate independent peer review in
listing and recovery activities."' 14 1 This step would involve "[s]olicit[ing]
the expert opinions of three appropriate and independent specialists
regarding pertinent scientific or commercial data and assumptions relating
to the taxonomy, population models, and supportive biological and
ecological information for species under consideration for listing."' 42 With
this, the agencies proclaimed to have put the attributes of peer review into
motion.
In 2003, however, the GAO conducted a study of how FWS had
implemented the peer review policy. 43 Its findings were disturbing.
Perhaps most important, the process was informal and actually seemed to
invite bias. The report noted that FWS "officials told us that they have not
adopted a formal procedure to assess peer reviewers' independence, and
the [FWS] does not publicly disclose . . . potential conflicts or prior
involvement by its peer reviewers."' 144 Although the agency guidelines
explained that "[i]ndependent peer reviewers should be selected from the
academic and scientific community, Tribal and other native American
groups, Federal and State agencies, and the private sector," and that "those
selected [should] have demonstrated expertise and specialized knowledge
related to the scientific area under consideration,"' 145 it was the agencies
who selected their peer reviewers, reviewed the peer reviews, and reported
the results of the peer reviews. 146 The GAO found that FWS "[p]eer
reviewers are selected at the discretion of the field office scientists
responsible for developing listing and critical habitat decisions." 147 Not

139. See Doremus, supra note 37, at 1082-87.
140.

See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.

141. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy
for Peer Review in Endangered Species Act Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,270, 34,270 (July 1, 1994).
142. Id.
143. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-803, ENDANGERED SPECIES: FISH AND WILDLIFE
SERVICE USES BEST AVAILABLE SCIENCE TO MAKE LISTING DECISIONS, BUT ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
NEEDED FOR CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATIONS (2003).

144. Id. at 16.
145. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy
for Peer Review in Endangered Species Act Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. at 34,270 (July 1, 1994).
146. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule to Reclassify and
Remove the Gray Wolf from the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife in Portions of the
Conterminous United States, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,804, 15,819-20 (Apr. 1, 2003) (discussing FWS's use of
the peer review process in connection with a decision about the status of gray wolves (Canis lupus)).
147. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 143, at 15. By contrast, the NRC peer review policy,
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surprisingly, the study noted that the peer reviewers chosen by FWS
usually agreed with the agency's positions. 148 Without clearly independent
reviewers, this process and its results are open to charges of
manipulation. 149
Ironically, OMB provides no more encouraging an example in its own
actions. OMB has been required since 1997 to provide Congress an
accounting statement and a report on the guidelines it has issued
estimating the total annual costs and benefits of agency regulation and
analyzing the impact of regulation on small businesses, local, state and
tribal governments, and economic growth. 150 In 2000, Congress required
OMB to ensure an "independent and external peer review of the guidelines
and each accounting statement and associated report."15 1 Research by
Joanna Goger on OMB's peer review practice has revealed that the
process has no internal guidelines, no conflict of interest disclosure
requirements, repeatedly uses the same reviewers, and has no requirement
of balance.1 52 One reviewer wrote to OMB following his review of the
2001 report, "[a]t this point, you are likely getting tired of my comments
so that next year you might want to bring on a new reviewer in my
place." ' 153 Beyond the problem of hypocrisy-this process clearly fails to
satisfy the procedures called for in OMB's proposal that other agencies
must follow-is the institutional concern that OMB seems to have

under which the Klamath Committee was formed, provides:
[t]he Research Council does not permit governmental agencies that sponsor projects to select
committee members because of the institution's commitment to ensuring independence and
objectivity in carrying out its work. However, sponsors can and often do suggest nominees,
some of whom may be selected. Such a selection could be made when the individuals
nominated by a sponsor have the expertise, knowledge, and stature required and can be
expected to participate in a committee's work without being subjected to undue influence or
pressure from the sponsoring agency.
Nat'l Acadamies, THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL PROCESS, http://www.nationalacademies.org/
about/faq4.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
148.

GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 143, at 21-22.

149. For example, the ability of an author to suggest or exclude reviewers in the scientific-journalpublishing context has been shown to increase the chances of being selected for publication. See David
Grimm, Suggesting or Excluding Reviewers Can Help Get Your Paper Published, 309 SCIENCE 1974,
1974 (2005).
150. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-99-59, REGULATORY ACCOUNTING: ANALYSIS
OF OMB's REPORTS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATION 14-15 (1999). The
OMB example is based on the presentation of Joanna B. Goger, Peer Review of OMB "sCost-Benefit
Reports to Congress, Center for Progressive Regulation workshop, Baltimore, MD (Apr. 16, 2004)
(presentation slides on file with authors).
151. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 624(d), 114 Stat. 2763,
2763A-162 (2000).
152. Goger, supra note 150.
153.

Id.
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followed the FWS example of cherry-picking reviewers. This suggests that
agencies may systematically tend to use peer review to support their
decisions rather than as a critical outside check on the accuracy of their
decisions. In its worst extremes, then, peer review can become a cynical
exercise, allowing agencies to manipulate the process and rig outcomes to
justify agency decisions that might not withstand legitimate peer scrutiny.
The final major institutional critique of regulatory peer review is, even
if the preceding concerns-that peer review will not improve agency
decisions and will be politically manipulated-are mistaken, the demand
on resources needed to carry out reviews will significantly delay
regulatory decisions. This is the "paralysis by analysis" charge leveled
against other broad, mandatory regulatory procedures such as cost-benefit
analysis and risk assessments, criticized as "offering regulatory relief for
industry in the guise of more rational procedures."' 154 Inflexibly mandating
rigorous peer review adds substantial demands on agency resources,
potentially draining resources from other decision making
55 components
and, in many cases, impeding decision making altogether. 1
Indeed, the statutory and regulatory deadlines frequently placed on
agency decision making acknowledge the pressing need in many cases to
intervene on policy problems. 156 Agencies already have difficulty meeting
those deadlines, 157 and adding peer review steps to the process is unlikely
to improve that experience. If regulatory peer review were to lengthen the
decision process, it is possible in some cases that an agency would be
unable to act before it is too late, for example, allowing an endangered
species to move ever closer to extinction while the agencies engage in
further process. In the context of regulatory regimes in which decision

154. Noah, supra note 25, at 1068; see also Randolph J. May, OMB's Peer Review ProposalSwamped by Science?, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Spring 2004, at 4, 4-5 (describing mandatory peer
review as "an invitation for regulatory ossification").
155. Thus twenty former high-level agency officials, including former EPA directors Carol
Browner and Russell Train, signed a letter to OMB stating that implementation of the OMB "proposal
would lead to increased costs and delays in disseminating information to the public and in
promulgating health, safety, environmental and other regulations." Letter from Carol M. Browner et
al., to Joshua B. Bollen, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget (Jan. 9, 2004), http://www.progressive
regulation.org/articles/Letter._Bolten_.Sig.pdf.
156. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (2000) (ESA deadlines for listing of species and designating
critical habitat); Id. § 1536(b) (deadlines for interagency consultations).
157. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-93, ENDANGERED SPECIES: MORE FEDERAL
MANAGEMENT ATTENTION Is NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE CONSULTATION PROCESS 14-17 (2003),

(explaining how frequently the agencies exceed deadlines applicable to consultation under Section
7(a)(2) of the ESA).
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time matters, mandatory regulatory peer review may well cause greater
harms of omission than of commission. 158
Figure 5.Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which
they agree or disagree with the following statements about the
potential effects of applying regulatory peer review to proposed
regulatory decisions. Figures show the percentage of respondents in
each category.
Strongly
Agree
a. It is likely substantially to slow down
17

Somewhat
Agree
47

No
Opinion
15

Somewhat
Disagree
18

Strongly
Disagree
3

agency decisionmaking processes.

b. It is likely to add substantially to the
costs of agency decisionmaking.

10

47

16

23

4

c. It is likely to add substantially to the
incidence of litigation over agency

7

19

17

45

12

3

17

29

40

10

9

31

30

23

7

8

40

28

19

5

24

37

20

16

3

decisions.

d. It is likely to lead to erosion of agency
personnel morale.
e. It is likely to deter agencies from
making the kinds of decisions that are
subject to regulatory peer review.
f. It is likely to be subject to manipulation
by agencies to serve their interests.
g. It is likely to be subject to manipulation
by interest groups to serve their interests.

Our survey showed that many practitioners do in fact believe that one
or more of these three major concerns about regulatory peer review are
likely to occur, as shown in Figure 5. The results indicated no surprising
differences of opinion on these issues between government and industry
attorneys. As shown in Figure 6, industry attorneys are more likely to
believe regulatory peer review will slow down agency work and be subject
to manipulation, and government attorneys are more likely to believe it
will add to litigation and erode agency morale; the two groups agreed that
regulatory peer review would likely add to agency costs, and were equally
mixed in feeling it would steer agencies away from making decisions
subject to peer review.
Figure 6: The second column shows which group (federal or state
government career (Govt) or private firm/in-house corporate career

158. See McGarvey & Marshall, supra note 7, at 108-09 (suggesting this is a serious concern
under the ESA).
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(Corp)) was significantly more likely to agree with the statement in
the first column (i.e., answer "strongly agree" or "somewhat
agree"), based on the breakdown between the two groups who
agreed (third and fourth columns). To indicate the strength of the
difference, if any, between the two groups, the fifth column shows
the odds that a person selected randomly from the more likely group
would agree with the statement compared to a person selected
randomly from the less likely group.
More Likely to
Agree
a. It is likely substantially to slow
down agency decision making
processes.
b. It is likely to add substantially to
the costs of agency decision making.
c. It is likely to add substantially to
the incidence of litigation over agency

% agreeing that
were Govt
37

Corp

% agreeing that
were Corp

Odds

63

3:1

Neither

Govt

71

29

6.2:1

Govt

70

30

5.5:1

Corp

35

65

3.6:1

Corp

37

63

2.9:1

decisions.

d. It is likely to lead to erosion of
agency personnel morale.
e. It is likely to deter agencies from
making the kinds of decisions that are
subject to regulatory peer review.
f. It is likely to be subject to
manipulation by agencies to serve

Neither

their interests.

g. It is likely to be subject to
manipulation by interest groups to
serve their interests.

Overall, therefore, the arguments against regulatory peer review, while
not based on persuasive empirical evidence, do find support in basic
institutional theory and in perceptions that are widely held among
experienced practitioners of regulatory law. Hence, while the case for
regulatory peer review seems to deserve serious consideration, so too does
the case for proceeding with caution. Indeed, most of our respondents
agreed that, on balance, the costs of regulatory peer review would not
significantly outweigh the benefits.159 Rather than never employing
regulatory peer review, or employing it all the time, a balanced approach
seems appropriate.

159. Fifty-four percent of our survey respondents disagreed with the statement that "the likely
costs (such as slowing down agency decisions) would significantly outweigh the likely benefits (such
as improving the quality of agency data selection)," whereas only 29 percent agreed and 16 percent
had no opinion. Government attorneys were almost three times more likely to agree with the statement
than were industry attorneys.
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Yet peer review has become a pawn in a much larger debate over the
appropriate roles of science and policy in our society.1 60 As such, its
supporters and its opponents alike overstate its advantages and
disadvantages. 161 There is little question increased use of regulatory peer
review would detect some cases of agency failure, but it could also create
considerable drag on agency process. After all, the Klamath Committee
confidently concluded that the federal agencies acted without scientific
foundation, but it took time and money to reach that conclusion. Most of
the asserted promises and pitfalls of regulatory peer review, however, are
posited in an empirical vacuum. In short, how much benefit or burden to
expect from wholesale or strategic application of regulatory peer review to
administrative decisions is really unknown.
V. RECONCEIVING THE ROLE OF REGULATORY PEER REVIEW
Since any discussion of regulatory peer review must be premised, for
now, on theory and perception rather than empirical evidence, it is
important to think clearly about how to balance countervailing concerns,
particularly given the high level of political interest in taking action. In
assessing any specific proposal, therefore, three overarching questions
about regulatory peer review must be addressed: (1) what are its most
important potential benefits; (2) where in the regulatory process should it
be applied to maximize these benefits; and (3) under what conditions
would it most likely substantially hinder or otherwise undermine agency
process?
A. Defining PotentialBenefits
Most of the fog surrounding regulatory peer review arises from the
proclivity of almost everyone involved in the debate to conflate science
and policy, as if agencies make one holistic conclusion about each
particular regulatory decision. After the Klamath Committee issued its
report, for example, one FWS official concluded, accurately, that the
Committee "didn't say the science proves we were wrong; they just said
there wasn't enough science to prove us right."'' 62 In science, of course,
that is enough-one generally does not get published in scientific journals
based on a claim that one's research did not prove anything. Yet, the FWS

160. See supranotes 11-17 and accompanying text.
161. See supra Parts III-IV.
162.

Michael Grunwald, Scientific Report Roils a Salmon War, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2002, at Al.
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official clearly took solace in the peer review's finding a lack of scientific
support for the agency's position rather than finding that scientific data
actually refuted the agency's position.
The difference, for regulatory decisions at least, is grounded in the
policy component of administrative decisions. In fact, Congress rarely
commands that an agency decision be based solely on scientific evidence
conclusively proving the decision correct. In the Klamath setting, for
example, the decision FWS was required to make involved an evaluation
of whether the Bureau of Reclamation's proposed water diversions would
jeopardize the continued existence of the protected fish species, 163 and
Congress has commanded that FWS use the "best scientific and
commercial data available" to make that decision. 164 This standard's
"obvious purpose . . . is to ensure that the ESA not be implemented

haphazardly, on the basis of speculation or surmise."' 165 But that does not
preclude an agency's well-reasoned use of professional judgment in the
face of incomplete scientific evidence. Frequently, perhaps most of the
time, it will be the case that an agency must use some basis in addition to
the best scientific data available for reaching a jeopardy decision. In some
regulatory settings Congress might prescribe additional policy-based
factors, such as cost-benefit analysis, that an agency must meld with its
scientific analysis to reach a final regulatory decision. 166 In other cases,
such as the ESA jeopardy analysis, it may come down simply to the
agency's exercise of professional judgment about which way to lean when
the science is not definitive in either direction, jeopardy or nonjeopardy.
Indeed, FWS and NOAA frequently have stated that they will err on the
side of the species in such cases. 167 This may be a perfectly appropriate
policy decision, but it forecloses the agency's use of science to prove itself
right in particular cases.
The problem is that agencies might not make explicit the policy-based
preferences or findings underlying their decisions. In the Klamath
experience, for example, neither FWS nor NOAA presented any basis to

163.

See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).

164. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2),(c); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8) (2005).
165. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176 (1997).
166. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (requiring cost-benefit analysis for designation of critical
habitat under the ESA).
167. See Interagency Cooperation-Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended; Final Rule, 51
Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,952 (June 3, 1986) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402) ("[T]he Service must
provide the 'benefit of the doubt' to the species concerned."); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT'L
MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES CONSULTATION HANDBOOK: PROCEDURES FOR
CONDUCTING CONSULTATION AND CONFERENCE ACTIVITIES UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE ENDANGERED

SPECIES ACT 1-6 (1998), availableat http://endangered.fws.gov/consultations/s7hndbk/s7hndbk.htm.
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the Klamath Committee other than science for their respective
decisions.' 68 In other words, once the Klamath Committee "said there
wasn't enough science to prove us right," 169 the agencies were left
speechless-they had articulated no reasoned alternative basis to justify
their decisions that led directly to the termination of irrigation water. It is
not clear whether the agencies believed their scientific explanation was
airtight, and thus no professional judgment was needed, or whether they
simply believed enough science was presented that nobody would ask for
additional justification. Had the Klamath Committee not conducted its
peer review, nobody would have asked, at least not in any way that would
have been likely to succeed in demonstrating the lack of scientific support
for the agencies' positions.
Hence one benefit-perhaps the chief benefit-that could reasonably
be expected to derive from the use of regulatory peer review is that it
would encourage agencies to provide sharper delineations between
scientific and policy bases for decisions. Agencies should be loathe to
have science prove their decisions wrong, but should also take no pride
when science fails to prove their decisions correct and no other supporting
basis exists in the decision record. This is not to say that science alone
must ever conclusively prove an agency right in order for its decision to be
consistent with statutory expectations. Rather, it is important that agencies
not overstate, either by commission or omission, the role science plays in
justifying their decisions relative to non-scientific, policy-driven bases. In
short, the public ought to know how far science takes the agency in
support of its decision, and what beyond science fills any gaps.
It is not just our survey's potentially biased industry attorneys who
believe this is an important goal of administrative law. A National
Research Council committee of experts recently convened to review the
scientific support for federal agency management decisions in the Platte
River Basin explained the difficulty agencies face in integrating
incomplete and inconclusive science into regulatory decisions that involve
value judgments.1 70 The committee observed that the policy aspects of
such decisions
are not scientific in the sense that they could, even in theory, be
decided solely through evaluation of empirical, objectively gathered
168. This is based on J.B. Ruhl's personal experience as a member of the Klamath Committee.
169. Grunwald, supra note 162.
170. See COMM. ON ENDANGERED & THREATENED SPECIES IN THE PLATTE RIVER BASIN, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES OF THE PLATTE RIVER 92-100 (2005).
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data. They require social or political value judgments that are
inevitably subjective. The committee believes that these judgments
should be made transparent; that is, [an agency] should clearly
explain in a decision document both its evaluation of the scientific
171
data and its use of nonscientific factors to reach a final decision.
Similarly, Cary Coglianese and Gary Marchant recently observed that
[e]mbedded within any bare claim that a policy decision is "based
on" science, or that science "leads to" a particular policy choice,
will be some underlying normative position. If the core normative
dimension to any policy decision is camouflaged in science, the
resulting policy outcomes, as well as any explanations or
in their defense, will likely be inconsistent if
rationalizations offered
72
not unreasonable. 1
If a sharper delineation between science-based and policy-based
support for decisions is seen as a benefit in the regulatory context, one
would be hard-pressed to identify a better method for sharpening that line
than regulatory peer review. 173 As a committee of scientists speaking on
behalf of the Society for Conservation Biology observed well before the
peer review debate flew into high gear:
Independent scientific review (ISR) can help ensure that
environmental decisions and policy making reflect the best
scientific knowledge of the day. Most environmental issues are
burdened with historical momentum, economic implications, and
cultural values that may dominate decision making in the absence of
scientific information. An ISR can help decision makers focus on
the oxbjective [sic], scientific variables apart from economic,
historical, or cultural factors and to interpret issues in the context of
great ecological complexity and uncertainty. Also ISR can raise the
level of public trust in the process, alleviating fears that industries,
environmental protection organizations, or government agencies are

171. Id. at 99-100.
172. Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk
Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1255, 1360 (2004).
173. As Professors Doremus and Tarlock observe, "[a]ppropriate outside review which generates
a publicly available report can ... make scientific, political, and even management judgments more
transparent." Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 16, at 32; see also Holly Doremus, Science Plays
Defense: Natural Resources Management in the Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 302
(2005) ("Peer review.., can, under the best circumstances, also increase transparency by pointing out
limitations in the data, unconventional scientific judgments, or places where policy judgments must
have been made.").
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simply promoting their own interests or74 moving ahead without
benefit of relevant scientific information. 1
And this message from the scientific community has persisted through
the throes of the debate. Yet another National Research Council committee
recently concluded, for example, that peer review when properly
conducted is a critical component of the objectivity, transparency,75 and
openness desired to instill public confidence in regulatory decisions. 1
Perhaps it is time to start listening to the scientists about the virtues of
peer review! Indeed, even in its scientific applications, peer review is not
expected to prove any research wrong, but rather to identify flaws and
deficiencies in a particular research effort that may call into question
whether the researcher's conclusions are justified. 176 If peer reviewers in
regulatory settings identify aspects of a regulatory decision not supported
by science, they have performed this service, and it would be left to the
agency to explain what nonscientific factors went into filling the gap. 177
But where in the regulatory process can peer review best be applied so as
to maximize these potential benefits?
B. Mapping PeerReview Onto Regulation
Opponents of the "sound science" movement frequently (and we
believe accurately) point out that the movement's primary aim seems to be
to increase the quantity rather than the quality of the agencies' sciencei.e., to impose on agencies the duty to do science more often rather than to
use science more carefully. 178 Some agencies, of course, engage in pure
research, and presumably no one is opposed to having those agencies
undergo scientific peer review. But most regulatory agencies, such as FWS
in conducting a jeopardy evaluation, are neither expected by law nor

174.

Gary K. Meffe et al., Independent Scientific Review in Natural Resource Management, 12

CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 268, 268 (1998).
175. See COMM. ON DEFINING BEST SCIENTIFIC INFO. AVAILABLE FOR FISHERIES MGMT., NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING THE USE OF THE "BEST SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION AVAILABLE"

STANDARD IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 56-57 (2004) (noting that "peer review is the most accepted

and reliable process for assessing the quality of scientific information. Its use as a quality control
measure enhances the confidence of the community (including scientists, managers, and stakeholders)
in the findings presented in scientific reports.").
176. See supra Part II.A.
177. By doing so, moreover, regulatory peer review might improve not only the quality of agency
use of science, but also the quality of agency policy justifications by inducing agencies to make those
justifications more explicit. Our attention is devoted strictly to the former effect, but scholars studying
how to improve the transparency and legitimacy of agency policy rationales, see, e.g., Markell, supra
note 14, may find our proposal beneficial to their cause.
178. See Burke, supra note 8, at 512-14; Wagner, Bad Science, supra note 13, at 109-32.
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equipped by budget to conduct the original research necessary to evaluate
a decision. In the general sense, therefore, the "sound science" movement
is truly off the mark.
Peer review, however, is simply one component of the practice of
competent science, and it does not directly require researchers to do more
science. It is quality control, not quantity control. To be sure, the result of
peer review may be to fault a researcher for shortcutting some aspect of
research-not enough test runs, too few data points, insufficient control
procedures, and so on-which may translate into a finding that the
research design was inadequate. But peer review does not impose arbitrary
minimum quantities of procedures on researchers. To the extent that an
agency is candid about the relative contribution of science and policy
bases in support of a regulatory decision, therefore, regulatory peer review
focuses exclusively on the science component. Anyone who has in mind
going further-that is, subjecting the agency's policy rationales to
evaluation-is not talking about importing scientific peer review into the
regulatory process.
Defined as such, peer review actually maps onto the regulatory process
in a rather straightforward manner. Using the components of scientific
peer review introduced above, the following model compares scientific
peer review to the four stages where science is used in regulatory decision
making: (1) the search for scientific data; (2) the selection of data (found
through the search) for use in the decision; (3) the interpretation of the
selected data in terms relevant to the decision; and (4) the integration of
that interpretation with whatever other factors the agency must or may
consider in order to reach a final decision.
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Scientific Peer Review
What was the quality of the
research design and data
collection procedures?

Regulatory Peer Review
Did the agency consult
appropriate sources of data and
scientific research on the issue
for decision?
Selection
Were the methods for testing Did the agency appropriately
the hypothesis appropriate and select data and research
robust?
identified in the search?
Interpretation To what extent are the
Did the agency draw appropriate
conclusions supported by the scientific conclusions from the
analysis of the data?
data and research it selected?
Integration
Not relevant-science is the Not applied-although the
exclusive source of the
agency might use other sources
conclusions drawn in
to reach its regulatory decision,
scientific research.
regulatory peer review stops at
evaluation of the agency's
interpretation of the selected data
and research.
Stage
Search

To illustrate more concretely how this model operates, consider the
decision FWS and NOAA must make, once they have listed a species, on
whether to designate "critical habitat" for the species. Section 4(a)(3)
requires the agencies, within certain time frames, and only "to the
maximum extent prudent and determinable," to "designate any habitat of
such species which is . .. considered to be critical habitat."' 79 Section
3(5)(A)(i) defines critical habitat as "specific areas within the geographic
area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed . .

.

.on which are

found those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation
of the species and (II) which may require special management
considerations or protection." 180 Areas outside the geographic range of the
species may be designated if they are "essential for the conservation of the
species.""181 These determinations must be made "on the basis of the best
scientific data available."' 182 In either case, however, the agency must
"tak[e] into consideration the economic impact, the impact on national
security, and any other relevant impact, of specifying a particular area as
critical habitat."' 83 Taking those impacts into consideration, the agency
"may exclude any area from critical habitat if... the benefits of such

179. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (2000).
180. § 1532(5)(A)(i).
181. § 1532(5)(A)(ii).
182. § 1533(b)(2).
183. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(b)(2) (Supp. 2005).
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exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area as part of the
critical habitat."'' 84 However, this impact analysis may not be used to
exclude an area if the agency "determines, based on the best scientific and
commercial data available, that the failure to designate such area
85 as critical
habitat will result in the extinction of the species concerned." 1
This snarl of science and policy decisions can be unpacked into its
discrete components as follows.
" Step One-Science: What is the geographic range of the species
and which areas within and outside that range contain biological
or physical features essential to the conservation of the species?
* Step Two-Policy: Which areas identified in Step One that are
within the geographic range require special management
consideration or protection?
" Step Three-Policy: What are the economic and other impacts
of designating areas that are candidates for designation after
conclusion of Step One and Step Two?
" Step Four-Policy: Does the impact analysis from Step Three
provide a basis for excluding candidate areas from designation,
on the ground that the social and economic benefits of exclusion
outweigh the benefits to the species of designation?
" Step Five-Science: Would exclusion of any areas based on
Step Four lead to the extinction of the species?
" Step Six-Policy: Is there any other reason why designation
would not be prudent?
This is depicted graphically as a flow chart on the following page.

184. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
185. Id.
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Step One: What is the geographic
range of the species and which areas
within and outside that range contain
biological or physical features
essential to the conservation of the
species?

Science

Step Two: Which areas identified in
Step One that are within the
geographic range require special
management consideration or
protection?

Policy

Step Two: Which areas identified in
Step One that are within the
geographic range require special
management consideration or
protection?

Step Three: What are the economic
and other impacts of designating
areas that are candidates for
designation after conclusion of Step
One and Step Two?

Policy

Step Three: What are the economic
and other impacts of designating
areas that are candidates for
designation after conclusion of Step
One and Step Two?

Step Four: Does the impact analysis
from Step Three provide a basis for
excluding candidate areas from
designation, on the ground that the
social and economic benefits of
exclusion outweigh the benefits to
the species of designation?

Policy

Step Four: Does the impact analysis
from Step Three provide a basis for
excluding candidate areas from
designation, on the ground that the
social and economic benefits of
exclusion outweigh the benefits to
the species of designation?

Science

Step Five: Would exclusion of any

Step Five: Would exclusion of any
areas based on Step Four lead to the

range of the species and which areas
within and outside that range
contain biological or physical
features essential to the conservation
of the species?

areas based on Step Four lead to the
extinction of the species?

extinction of the species?

Step Six: Is there any other reason
why designation would not be
prudent?

Sten One: What is the geographic

Policy

Step Six: Is there any other reason
why designation would not be
prudent?
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Regulatory peer review, as we suggest it should be constructed, would
not apply to any step designated as a policy question. Rather, only Step
One and Step Five in our configuration of the critical habitat decision tree
require the agency to search for, select, and interpret scientific data and
research. Regulatory peer review applied to those two stages of the
decision making process would engage in the following kinds of inquiry:
Scope of Peer Review Inquiry
What steps did the agency take to locate available
scientific data and research? Did the agency perform a
literature survey of relevant journal publications? Did
the agency solicit information from researchers with
relevant expertise at universities, other agencies, and
private research sources? Was the scope of the search
appropriate--e.g., if information about the species in
question is limited, did the agency search for data and
research about similar species?
Agency's selection of How did the agency evaluate the quality of available
data and research
data to select the "best available" as required by
identified in its search statute? Did the agency employ appropriate methods
for determining the relative quality of the data and
research sources identified in its search? Did the
agency exclude any data or research for inappropriate
reasons? Did the agency rely on data or research of
questionable reliability?
Agency's interpretation Are the agency's conclusions about the geographic
range of the species, biological and physical features
of data and research
selected
essential to the conservation of the species, and the
threat of extinction if specific areas were excluded from
designation all justified based on the peer reviewer's
assessment of the data and research the agency should
have selected? Did the agency make appropriate
conclusions about what were the "maximum
determinable" aspects of each of these inquiries?
Peer Review Focus
Agency's search for
data and research

None of these questions strikes us as inconsistent with the type of
inquiry conducted in scientific peer review. Nor do they strike us as
inappropriate questions to ask of an agency purporting to base its
regulatory decision in any significant part on science. These questions, if
rigorously pursued, would likely lead reviewers to detect cases in which
an agency attempted to oversell what its scientific case supports, and thus
would be likely to encourage agencies to be more careful in their search
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for, selection, and interpretation of scientific data and research. Scientific
peer review, in other words, maps quite nicely onto the regulatory process
to produce regulatory peer review.
C. Avoiding Drag
And what of the legitimate concern over making agencies jump
through more hoops? Our formulation of regulatory peer review focuses
on the quality of the agency's use of science, not the quantity of how much
science it conducts. As previously noted, achieving quality in the use of
science may require some agencies to do more work than they have in the
past-conduct broader literature searches, deliberate more over relative
quality of data, spend more time analyzing the data and research-but if
an agency presents any of its work as scientific in quality, there is a
minimum standard it must meet to do so credibly. Asking agencies to
substantiate their scientific claims ought not strike anyone as repugnant to
appropriate administrative procedures.
As to the concern that regulatory peer review imposes unrealistic
burdens of proof, that also is not the case under our formulation of the
process. Regulatory peer review does not import the default scientific
burden of proof: that the data support the conclusion within a 95% level of
confidence. Rather, regulatory peer review imports the standards of proof
prescribed in the relevant statutory program. In the critical habitat
designation procedure, for example, regulatory peer review would be
conducted within the statutory directives that the agency consider only the
"best scientific data available" and reach conclusions based on what is the
"maximum determinable" from that body of information.
Finally, as to the concern that regulatory peer review will unduly
impede and interfere with agencies' policy deliberations, that is the least
likely effect under the formulation we propose. The unyielding boundary
of regulatory peer review stops at the line between agency interpretation of
available data and research and integration of the agency's scientific
conclusions with other factors in the decision making procedure. Indeed, if
regulatory peer review produces any improvement in the quality of
agencies' use of science, which we believe it would, it should only
improve agencies' policy deliberations by providing more confidence in
the scientific input and more explicit delineation between what is science
and what is policy in the justification the agency presents for its final
decision.
Nevertheless, we do recognize that regulatory peer review must be
conducted properly if it is to be conducted at all. Wendy Wagner and
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others have argued persuasively that sham regulatory peer review may
actually prove counterproductive by helping agencies overstate the extent
of support they derive from science by giving policy decisions the
appearance of a scientific exercise. 186 Moreover, regulatory peer review
will take time and money to conduct, resources that may be taken away
from other important agency functions. Both are legitimate concerns. Peer
review can be misused, just as science can be misused. The answer to both
concerns is the same: design matters. Accordingly, we next outline a
proposal for implementing regulatory peer review which we believe would
yield all the major benefits without compromising effectiveness.
VI. A PROPOSED MODEL OF RANDOMIZED PEER REVIEW
This Article has set out the main arguments in favor of and opposed to
regulatory peer review, described the major peer review initiatives in
Congress and OMB, and looked at how we should think about peer
review, all leading to three key points. First, peer review can improve
agency decision making based on the use and interpretation of scientific
data, but, second, how many agency decisions actually would be improved
by peer review is unknown. And this matters because, third, the practice of
peer review imposes costs. The policy question thus becomes how we can
capture the benefits of regulatory peer review at lowest cost to improve
overall agency decision quality. In our view, none of the major peer
review proposals provides an adequate answer.
The ESA legislation assumes that virtually all agency decisions
increasing species protection warrant regulatory peer review.' 87 This
approach is senselessly over-inclusive (imposing peer review on all ESA
protection measures would significantly weaken the statute's ability to
conserve biodiversity) as well as under-inclusive (de-listing decisions and
incidental take permits also rely on scientific data but would not be subject
to peer review). Indeed, even though most of our survey respondents
favored regulatory peer review, over two-thirds of the respondents
opposed applying it to all regulatory decisions of an agency.
The OMB proposal, which became effective in December, 2004,
implicitly recognizes that subjecting all agency information products to
peer review imposes too many costs. Thus it mandates peer review for
data that could have a substantial impact on important public policies,
agency decisions that impose private sector impact of over $500 million,

186. See, e.g., Wagner, Science Charade, supra note 13, at 1700.
187. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
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and decisions that involve precedent-setting, novel and complex
approaches. 188 A slim majority-55 percent-of our survey respondents
favored this approach. Nevertheless, while these thresholds do provide
cut-off points, they could also screen out many discrete regulatory actions
from consideration. The OMB proposal seems to either assume that these
actions would not benefit from peer review (which seems questionable) or
that review would prove too expensive. It is also worth noting that OMB's
guidelines assume that if an agency relies on peer-reviewed research, the
need for peer review is eliminated. This highlights the ultimate
shortcoming of the OMB guidelines-peer review is required only for
"information products," not for how the agencies use the "information
products" in their regulatory decisions.' 89 If OMB cares about improving
the quality of regulatory decisions and not just the information products,
which seems to be the case given the threshold standards, its guidelines do
so only in an indirect manner. 190 By focusing on information products and
excluding peer-reviewed research, the key steps of search, selection, and
interpretation set out in Section V are missed. By focusing only on the
quality of the information agencies use, it is not at all clear that the OMB
Guidelines will, or can, effectively address whether the agency
appropriately interpreted and applied the information.
The peer review critics' counter-proposals are unsatisfying as well.
Groups calling for no peer review at all either deny that any agency
decisions would benefit from peer review or claim that, in any case, the
medicine will prove worse than the disease. Sidney Shapiro takes a more
nuanced approach, recommending that agencies be allowed to employ ad
hoc procedures for deciding when peer review is appropriate.'91 Given the
self-serving experiences of FWS, NOAA, and OMB with peer review,
however,192 there is little reason to be optimistic that the quality-control
benefits of peer review would endure. If these agencies' experiences
provide any guide, the legitimacy of peer review would be undermined by
agency discretion and self-interest in its application. In his comment letter
on behalf of the Center for Progressive Regulation, Shapiro offers a
188. See supra notes 105-17 and accompanying text.
189. See Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664, 2665 (Jan. 14,
2005).
190. Given the wording of the Data Quality Act, OMB likely had no choice but to restrict its
guidelines to information products. Shapiro, supra note 25, at 10,066-68.
191. Letter from Sidney A. Shapiro, Bd. Member and Treasurer, Ctr. for Progressive Regulation,
to Dr. Margo Schwab, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Office of Mgmt. & Budget 5-6 (May 27,
2004), http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/shapiro-omb.pdf.
192. See supra notes 140-48, 150-53 and accompanying text.
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different proposal, that OMB should "limit peer review to circumstances
where scientific assessments set a new precedent or are reasonably
controvertible."'193 This proposal was largely adopted in the revised OMB
proposal described above, but it focuses more on the nature of the data
than the nature of the decision, which is clearly where the interest lies in
regulatory peer review.
If all of these proposals have serious shortcomings, is there a better
approach? We believe there is, but to explain why one needs to return to
first principles. In order to craft a peer review policy, we need to be clear
about what the most significant benefits of peer review are. Debate and
scholarship to date have largely focused on three types of benefits. The
most obvious is quality control. Hence the descriptions of peer review as a
"second opinion" that catches mistakes in the original decision's use of
science or as an expert filter that catches bias or theory protection in the
original decision. 194 This is closely linked to the legitimizingfunction of
peer review. As OMB has argued, peer review can promote greater public
confidence in agency use of science. 195 This is the reason most scientists
believe that peer review is "essential to the integrity of scientific and
scholarly communication."1' 96 Peer review also serves a deliberative
function, providing for give and take between proponent and reviewers. 197
Serious debate continues over how substantial these potential benefits
are, however, because of significant uncertainty with respect to how often
agencies overstate the extent of scientific support for their regulatory
decisions. Implicit in the arguments of Representative Walden and OMB
is the assumption that agencies do overstate support frequently enough to
justify making peer review commonplace. Otherwise their proposals
would be poifitless, requiring extensive reviews to address a negligible
problem. Critics of these proposals similarly argue that the problems
surrounding agencies' use of science have been exaggerated. As noted in
the Introduction, though, it is simply not clear how many Klamaths are out
there.

193. Shapiro, supra note 191, at 5-6.
194. Quality control is equally important in the context ofjournal peer review. Rowland's study of
scientists' perceptions of peer review found that "[ilt is widely agreed that this improving function by
referees is of value in maintaining the overall quality of the scholarly literature." ROWLAND, supra
note 32, at 1.
195. See Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023, 54,024
(Sept. 15, 2003).
196.

WELLER, supra note 29, at 322.

197. This is particularly evident in journal peer review, in which approximately 80% of submitted
papers are in the "publishable with amendments and improvements" category. ROWLAND, supra note
32, at 1.
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Yet this ignorance forms the basis for our proposal, for regulatory peer
review offers a potential benefit that no one has talked about-its
diagnosticfunction. Neither advocates nor critics of regulatory peer review
can intelligently assess the merits of requiring it-whether restricted to
major decisions, decisions that create precedent, or decisions that protect
species-without first having a clear sense of whether none, a few, or
many of these decisions would benefit from peer review. Yet this critically
198
important issue has received little consideration in the current debate.
The greatest benefit of peer review may lie in providing empirical data on
the scope of the problem that can then tell us whether broader or reduced
use of peer review is warranted.' 99
To capture all the benefits outlined above, we propose a model of
Randomized Peer Review with three discrete stages:
Stage One. Target Decisions
First identify classes of regulatory decisions that would likely
benefit from peer review. This would include types of agency
decisions that rely on scientific data and scientific judgments
(similar to the description of the critical habitat designation decision
shown in Part IV). Within this broad class of decisions, randomly
select a subset of specific regulatory decisions within a six-month
period. 200 To commence, we would suggest following the IRS audit
practice of selecting roughly 1-2% of the eligible decisions.2 0 '

198. The Natural Resources Defense Council, it should be noted, asked OMB to shelve its
proposal and assemble a panel of experts on peer review to assess whether existing practices are a
problem. Monique Waples, Comment on Peer Review Standards, (Dec. 23, 2003), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2003iq/72.pdf
199. Professors Doremus and Tarlock recognize that "[e]ffective outside reviews can also spur
learning, by inspiring new thinking, demanding accountability, and highlighting gaps in the existing
data base that could be filled." Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 16, at 33. We are suggesting that peer
review also spurs learning about the quality of agency practices in general.
200. The OMB proposal also focuses on information that will have an important impact on public
policies or an impact of more than $500 million per year. See supra notes 105-17 and accompanying
text. We believe that focusing on science underpinning discrete regulatory decisions is more
appropriate because, at its core, this is really what parties on both sides of the sound science debate
care about-whether the science underpinning agency decisions is accurate and properly interpreted.
201. As regulators well know, deterrent effects can be realized even when compliance inspections
are conducted less than 100% of the time for fewer than 100% of the regulated facilities. The number
of reviews, of course, could not exceed the review budget, which would ultimately determine the
percent used. In 2005, for example, the IRS audited only 0.93% of all individual returns. By contrast,
roughly one in five large corporations (with returns of $10 million and over) were audited. See Posting
of Charles Rubin to http://www.rubinontax.blogspot.com/2006/03/latest-irs-audit-data.html (Mar. 28,
2006, 18:08 EST).
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Stage Two: Peer Review Decisions
The peer review of the science underpinning these decisions
would be conducted by groups of three experts selected from
standing panels established by the NRC. Peer reviewers would be
compensated in order to attract competent experts and encourage
timely performance, vetted for potential bias by the NRC through its
standard practice, appointed for a limited term, and kept anonymous
to the decision making agency except in cases in which the
reviewers' desire to conduct field investigation and interviews
precludes anonymity.2 °2 The peer review committees would not be
asked to conduct a de novo review of the agency's entire record and
decision. Rather, the committee would be asked to evaluate the
agency's protocol for identifying relevant scientific data and
research, its rationale for selecting and prioritizing data and research
from the identified pool, and its interpretation of this body of
science. When necessary, the peer reviewers could request
important data compilations or research reports relied upon by the
agency in making these evaluations. The peer review would be
completed in no more than ninety days and would not be subject to
the public meeting and other procedural requirements of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act. 203
Stage Three: Disseminate andAnalyze Reviews
The results of the peer review would be released to the agency
and the public prior to the conclusion of any public notice and
comment procedures applicable to the underlying decision. After a
period of two years, and every two years thereafter, the overall
results of the peer reviews conducted for a particular agency and
regulatory program (e.g., designations of critical habitat) would be
assessed to determine whether the audit rate is appropriate and,
more generally, whether the agency's use of science warrants the
mandatory or more intensive practice of regulatory peer review.
How well does this proposal capture the benefits yet minimize the costs
of regulatory peer review? For those decisions that are reviewed, the
proposal ensures quality control in particular cases. Based on the IRS

202. See supra note 147.
203. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-11 (2000).
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experience, the randomized aspect of the proposal is intended to create a
general deterrent effect, ensuring agency officials understand that their
decision may become subject to peer review. Through this approach, the
benefits of regulatory peer review will be more institutional in nature than
identifiable in discrete cases. In other words, if the audit rate is high
enough, the prospect of peer review would inherently lead agencies to
think twice about their use of science in making decisions. Such a
regulatory peer review framework may not substantially change the
outcome of many regulatory decisions, but it would beneficially influence
the way in which regulatory decisions are carried out. The proposal also
helps further legitimize agency decisions, ensuring a transparent process,
independent of agency influence, that the use of science was appropriate.
It promotes the deliberative function of peer review, furnishing an
independent, expert review of an agency decision that the agency can
consider in its final determination. And, perhaps most importantly, it
provides a way to empirically diagnose whether agency use of science
really should be of concern and to finally answer how many Klamaths are
out there.
But what of the downsides? As noted earlier, paralysis by analysis is a
real concern for resource-strapped agencies working under tight deadlines.
At some point, the quest for relevant, reliable, and reviewed data may add
so much time to the decision making process that the policy effectiveness
of the decision is impeded. What a hollow victory it would be, for
example, to spend so much time ensuring the reliability of the data proving
a species is endangered, yet find the species extinct by the time the
decision to protect it is finally made. Adding time and budget constraints
to the picture amplifies the prospect and potential intensity of these
conflicting constraints. Optimal decision making, in other words, requires
that we intentionally operate at an optimal level of ignorance,
understanding that comprehensive peer review would be counterproductive. 204
Our proposal has its costs, to be sure, but they are significantly less
than those of other proposals. If a 1-2% audit rate can serve as a
meaningful general deterrent and provide an accurate sample for analysis,
the most important benefits of more comprehensive review requirements
can be satisfied at a fraction of the cost. 20 5 Appropriating funds for the

204. For discussion of the conflicting constraints property of complex systems, and of regulatory
systems in particular, see J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of
RegulatoryAccretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 806-12 (2003).
205. In order to make these decisions, more information would be needed on the likely costs and
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NRC rather than the target agencies to pay for the reviews would also
ensure that agencies are not forced to sacrifice other activities in order to
carry out reviews.
And what about concerns that the peer review process will become
politicized or captured? Our proposal represents a measured approach that
enhances regulatory peer review but puts the decision about whether to use
it and how to conduct it outside of the agencies' control-and in the hands
of a generally respected neutral player. Although many stakeholders
disagreed with the Klamath Committee's conclusions and how the
20 6
Departments of Interior and Commerce incorporated them into policy,
no allegations were heard that the committee somehow was influenced by
bias. The same cannot be said of peer reviews that have been carried out
under the peer review policy FWS and NOAA have used for their ESA
*
207
decisions.
Our model of Randomized Peer Review also raises a series of
important administrative law questions. The first is how the agency should
use the reviews. This could range from treating the review no differently
than a comment letter from the general public to requiring an agency
response explaining why it has or has not revised its decision consistent
with the peer review results.20 8 In either case, the review would become
part of the administrative record for purposes of any judicial challenge.
The more difficult question turns on what role the peer review should play
if the agency decision is later challenged as arbitrary and capricious. Here
again, the court's treatment of the review could range from giving it no
special status to giving it the heightened deference accorded to views
expressed by sister agencies.20 9
In our view, the peer review report should be treated no differently than
public submissions through the notice and comment process of informal
rulemaking. Given the intense light and heat surrounding the sound

number of reviews. It is worth noting that, for a fraction of its $650,000 total budget, the Klamath
Committee was able within ninety days to conclude its initial peer review of the agency decisions.
206.
207.

See MOONEY, supra note 13, at 152-54.
See supra Part IV.B.

208. The agencies' existing peer review policy does not require this, and the agencies often are not
forthcoming about why they agree or disagree with their (hand-picked) peer reviewers. See, e.g.,
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of the Proposed Rule to List the

Mountain Plover as Threatened, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,083, 53,093 (Sept. 9, 2003) (after confirming the
merits of a proposed rule to list the mountain plover that was supported in two rounds of peer review,
FWS later withdrew the rule based ostensibly on new information, but without additional peer review).
209. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1031 (2d Cir. 1983)

(criticizing the Corps for disregarding negative comments in the environmental impact statement by
the Fish and Wildlife Agency).
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science debate, simple political expediency would likely force the
agency's hand. It would be a cocky agency director, indeed, who simply
ignored a critical peer review report (and likely a director who did not
mind traveling up to Capitol Hill to explain to skeptical Senators why the
agency's actions were contrary to the peer review). Similarly, we see no
need for the court to grant special deference to the review. In many cases
involving peer review the agency will be making decisions in the face of
scientific uncertainty. Upsetting the tendency of courts to defer to the
agency's choice in close-call cases-when some evidence exists in the
record to support a decision in either direction and the statute imposes no
default position-strikes us as unwarranted. 210 Fundamentally, it must be
remembered, the purpose of peer review is to improve agency decision
quality, not to arm litigants or undermine agency discretion.
VII. CONCLUSION

Agency use of peer review processes is neither new nor, until recently,
particularly controversial, yet it has not been widely used in regulatory
settings. The Klamath saga, the OMB mandate for peer review of
"information products" across the federal government, and the obvious
legislative attempts to bind the regulatory arms of the ESA through peer
review, however, have fundamentally changed the landscape. The ensuing
debate has generated inflated claims over the use of peer review in
regulatory settings as either a golden virtue or a sinister evil.
We have sought to show that regulatory peer review can meaningfully
improve agency decisions that rely on the use or interpretation of scientific
information, but that this alone tells us nothing about whether peer review
should therefore become part and parcel of agency decision processes. We
believe it is unwarranted and may well prove unwise to mandate peer
review across the board for agency actions, such as the preparation of
"information products" or the promulgation of rules or decisions based on
such information, without a clear understanding of the real extent of the
problem peer review is supposed to address. In proposing an approach of
randomized peer review, we seek to shift the debate away from whether
regulatory peer review is good or bad, or whether agencies are biased or
not, and on to a more productive, empirically grounded vantage from
which we can more intelligently assess the proper role for this process in
agency settings.

210. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.

